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ABSTRACT 
Within today’s irregular warfare environment, negotiations with insurgents are 
difficult because, in part, insurgents are often characterized as terrorists. Early in the Iraqi 
conflict, there was a perceived notion that the insurgent and terrorist were morphing into 
one entity.  This perceived morphing being the case, some US policy makers and senior 
military leaders have been reluctant to negotiate with Iraqi insurgents.  Acknowledging 
this reluctance, this thesis will focus on the role of negotiations in countering 
insurgencies.   
During the examination of historical cases of negotiations with insurgents, this 
thesis identifies commonalities within the case studies and tests the thesis’ hypotheses 
about the potential usefulness of negotiations as an element of countering insurgency 
strategy.   
The conceptual framework for the case studies utilizes several publications and 
articles to determine the feasibility and suitability of the information collected from the 
case studies themselves, in order to determine the role negotiations can play in countering 
an insurgency.   
The insights gathered from the historical case studies and analysis of the 
conceptual framework serves as the foundation to construct a notional negotiation 
strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq.  In conjunction with the information gathered 
from the historical case studies and literary survey, this thesis applies a theoretical model 
and defined terms to act as steering mechanisms when developing a notional negotiation 
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In 1964, Life magazine published an interview with General (Ret.) William 
Westmoreland, Commander US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
(COMUSMACV) 1964-1968.  During that interview, General Westmoreland commented 
on the US military forces approach to the insurgent problem that existed in Vietnam with 
the following assertions: 
We're going to out-guerrilla the guerrilla and out-ambush the ambush . . . 
And we're going to learn better than he ever did because we're smarter, we 
have greater mobility and firepower, we have more endurance and more to 
fight for.... And we've got more guts. (as cited in Sorley, 1999, p.528)   
Arguably, the ideology galvanized within the US military strategic culture is that 
in order for one to win, one must annihilate the enemy through maneuver and firepower.  
In some cases, this ideology holds true. Yet for the most part, during the Vietnam War 
and up to the most recent conflicts, when combating an insurgency the strategy of out 
maneuvering the guerrilla and out ambushing the ambush, has proved unsuccessful.  
During the Vietnam War, the use of firepower, or, more exactly, misdirected firepower, 
actually facilitated the growth of the Vietnamese insurgency which set the stage for the 
unprecedented defeat of United States armed forces in Vietnam.  As mentioned earlier, 
direct action has its place on the battlefield; however, when fighting an insurgency, this 
author advocates the employment of unconventional methods in order to defeat an 
unconventional opponent.  A key unconventional method that the author advocates is the 
use of negotiations, in addition to skillful unconventional operators, to serve as a 
mechanism to counter an insurgency.  Although critics of the employment of a 
negotiation strategy may debate its effectiveness, history has demonstrated, in most cases, 




The following examples illustrate the uses of negotiation strategies to counter and 
defeat the insurgent.  During the Philippine-American War from 1899-1902, the United 
States entered into negotiations for peace with insurgents, the results of which influenced 
President Theodore Roosevelt to declare the insurrection in the Philippines over.  
President Roosevelt’s declaration was immediately followed by the passing of the Cooper 
Act  (known as the Philippine Bill of 1902), July 1, 1902, which further marked  an end 
of  insurgent activity in the Philippines (Bautista, 2005).  Another example of successful 
negotiations to counter an insurgency occurred during the Algerian Insurgency, from 
1954-1962. “Algerian independence movements led to the uprisings of 1954–1955, 
which developed into full-scale war” (Algeria, 2005). Nevertheless, in 1962, in Evain, 
negotiations for peace between the French Government and the FLN led to a cease-fire.  
Although terrorist groups such as the OAS launched a campaign to destroy the cease-fire, 
the OAS’s efforts were in vain.  Those failed efforts demonstrated the power of a good 
faith negotiations strategy to counter an insurgency (“Algerian War,” n.d.). Nevertheless, 
although the French defeated the Algerian insurgency tactically, given the immoral and 
barbaric tactics employed, the Algerians won the war politically within the international 
community.  That said, given the power of the state, it is critical to exercise military as 
well as moral and ethical might during irregular warfare.   
As further evidence that a negotiation strategy can play a critical part in defeating 
an insurgency, consider Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Liberation War from 1968-1980 
features several negotiations which took place between the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian 
Smith and the insurgent group known as the “Patriotic Front,” consisting of once 
opposing groups , the ZAPU (The Zimbabwe African People’s Union) and the ZANU 
(The Zimbabwe African National Union).  However, negotiation efforts focusing on 
peace led to the signing of the “Lancaster Agreement” by all parties, that “put an end to 
the [insurgent] violence late in 1979 and negotiated an interim government and new 
elections” (Powers, 2001).  In all the previously mentioned insurgency examples, a 
negotiation strategy played a part in countering the insurgent strategy and postured the 
state to “win” by achieving its aims.  If this is the case, and historically the US itself 




1902, then the question is, why hasn’t the US employed a negotiation strategy to counter 
the modern day insurgents in Iraq?  General Richard B. Myers, former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2001-2005), has alluded to strategic communication, even with an 
adversary, in his 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of America by 
stating, “Effective deterrence requires a strategic communication plan and the willingness 
of the United States to employ forces . . .” (Myers, 2004, p.11).  Amplifying upon the 
need to employ strategic communications, a February 2005 TIME article, entitled U.S. 
Holds Secret Talks With Insurgents in Iraq, revealed US attempts to secretly negotiate 
with Iraqi insurgents.   
The magazine cited a secret meeting between two members of the U.S. 
military and an Iraqi negotiator, a former member of Saddam Hussein's 
government and the senior representative of what he called the nationalist 
insurgency.  "We are ready to work with you," the Iraqi negotiator said, 
according to Time.  
Iraqi insurgent leaders not aligned with al Qaeda ally Abu Musab Zarqawi 
told the magazine that several nationalist groups composed of what the 
Pentagon calls "former regime elements" have become open to 
negotiating.  
The insurgents said their aim was to establish a political identity that can 
represent disenfranchised Sunnis.  (Reuters, 2005, p. A22) 
Based on the preceding passages, one may question why the US military and 
policy makers are not enabling an open negotiating process with the insurgents in Iraq.  
One reason could be, given the insurgent activity and perceived morphing of the 
insurgents and terrorists into one entity, some US policy makers and senior military 
leaders are very reluctant to negotiate with the current day insurgent.  Although the 
attributes that make a terrorist a terrorist and an insurgent an insurgent appear to have 
morphed since the conception of the US policy of ‘no negotiations, no concessions’ with 
terrorists in 1973, there are still differences between the two groups. Classically, Pre-
9/11, the characteristic that separated the insurgent from the terrorist were targets.  The 
insurgent employed violence against mechanisms of the state.  The terrorist employed 




from the terrorist has become “blurred.”  Today a group such as the Al-Qaeda is pursuing 
a protracted warfare campaign that has been historically indicative of an insurgency.  
Nevertheless for this thesis, in efforts to bring clarity to the terms “insurgent” and 
“terrorist,” the author characterizes the two terms as the following: 
Both insurgents and terrorists are driven by political or social goals, 
employing or threatening to employ violent acts against the innocent and/ 
or mechanism of the state to achieve a political and/or social response or 
goal.    
However, the insurgent is associated with protracted warfare.  
Nevertheless, due to the insurgent’s commitment to change current social 
or political conditions, the insurgent is, in most cases, more willing to 
negotiate with state agencies.  Thus alluding to the preceding Time 
Magazine passage, “The insurgents said their aim was to establish a 
political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis” (Reuters, 
2005, p. A22).  Finally, the insurgent is of the people; therefore, his 
recruitment base is usually indigenous and local.  
Conversely, the terrorist is usually associated with a singular dynamic 
symbolic event, designed to captivate and potentially serve as a 
recruitment tool for the group.  The performance of violence usually 
demonstrates the power of the group in a violent manner.  The terrorist is 
usually not of the people; therefore, he is somewhat dependent on the act 
of terror to spread and reinforce his message.  Also, due to his level of 
commitment to the group’s ideology, in most cases, the terrorist is 
unwilling to negotiate with state agencies.  The following assertion made 
by Hizbullah’s Hussein Massawi in 2003 re-enforces the point: “We are 
not fighting so that you will offer us something.  We are fighting to 
eliminate you” (Kilcullen, n.d., p.1).  
Currently the Al-Qaeda is classified as a “Global Insurgency 
Organization.”  Although the Al-Qaeda is vaguely associated with an 
insurgency and follows a “protracted” campaign, for this thesis, the author 
is going to categorize this group and groups like the Al-Qaeda under the 
“terrorist umbrella.” 
Given the aforementioned characteristics, this thesis is not advocating that a 
negotiation process be entertained with the Usama Bin Laden’s (UBL) and Abu Musab 
Zarqawi’s (AMZ) of the world.  UBL and AMZ, being of the Al-Qaeda network, fall 
under the terrorist “umbrella.”  Arguably, given their commitment to their ideology, 




that negotiations have been an effective mechanism to de-link the networked world of the 
insurgent.  As the passages from TIME suggest, given their desire to re-establish their 
political identity, the Iraqi insurgents want to negotiate.  Although it appears that the Iraqi 
insurgents may have wanted to negotiate during the timeframe of February of 2005, US 
policy makers and military leaders continued with their reluctance to negotiate.  
Consequently, as US and coalition partners have failed to negotiate with Iraqi insurgents, 
the death toll for US forces has continued to rise surpassing 2400, at the time of this of 
this writing.  The vast majority of those US service members have been killed in action 
since the declaration of victory on May 11th, 2003 by President Bush, US policy makers 
and senior military leaders.  Therefore, the question emerges, is the reluctance to openly 
negotiate with insurgents, combined with the over reliance on direct action a viable 
policy strategy that will ensure victory in countering an insurgency?  The following 
paragraphs will demonstrate the purpose and relevance of this thesis.  
 
B. PURPOSE 
Nuclear weapons cannot deter all threats . . .  As examples, non-states and 
trans-national actors . . . cannot be bombed away. Dealing with these and 
other similar problems requires serious mind set changes.  (Blotzer, 1999, 
p.2)  
Within the environment of the Global War on Terrorism, the modern day 
insurgent has applied methods and tactics that closely resemble the methods and tactics a 
terrorist would employ. By utilizing such an approach, the insurgent’s intent is to shape 
the political and social environment of a prescribed area. The US military’s conventional 
“two up, one back” approach to countering the insurgent in places such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq, in the opinion of this author, has failed to stabilize and rid the prescribed 
environments of insurgent activity. Nevertheless, Dr. John Arquilla, a counter-terrorism 
expert of the Naval Postgraduate School, suggests the following in response to the senior 
military leadership’s approach to this new style of warfare: “Our biggest problem is that 
old ways of thinking about war remain dominant.  The Pentagon is full of senior officers 




(Arquilla, 2004).  Therefore this thesis asserts, in order to counter the current day 
insurgent, a much-needed serious mind set change must take place with senior military 
leaders and policy makers. The mind set change this thesis advocates is the employment 
of an indirect approach through a negotiation strategy.  Given the potential of a carefully 
blended negotiation strategy in support of the combined arms approach to warfare, this 
author feels this unconventional tandem is the new way states will encounter and defeat 
irregular warfare adversaries.  Therefore, this thesis will ask the question, “What role do 
negotiations play in countering an insurgency?”   
To determine the role negotiations have previously played in countering an 
insurgency, this thesis will examine historical cases of negotiation efforts. During this 
examination of the cases, the methodology will identify commonalities within the case 
studies through testing of the following hypotheses:  
1. Negotiations imply weakness, encouraging further violence. 
 
2. Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central 
leadership. 
 
3. The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent 
reprisal efforts by non-compliant actors. 
 
4. Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by 
step,” through an iterative process. 
 
5. Negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and 
cooperation. 
 
6. Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key 
individuals. 
 
7. Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that 
do not require overall linkages. 
 
The information gathered from the aforementioned hypotheses will assist the 
author in developing and shaping the notional negotiation strategy.  Although the 
methodology will test the aforementioned hypotheses, an area that is plaguing US policy 




apply to an unconventional opponent, as opposed to a conventional one.  For example “to 
win” on a conventional battlefield is very different from “winning” on an unconventional 
battlefield. Therefore, the purpose of defining such terms in the section below is to serve 
as a guide during the development of the ends, means and ways in support of the 
negotiation strategy. 
 
C. DEFINING THE TERMS 
In efforts to mitigate confusion between the terms “insurgent” and “terrorist” the 
author has characterized them both in the preceding paragraphs. Nevertheless given the 
current atmosphere associated with an insurgency and its environment, terms applied in a 
conventional manner to portray a situation, posture or disposition on the unconventional 
battlefield, arguably, confuse senior military leaders, policy makers and, more 
importantly, the civilians of a given state.  Therefore, it is the intent of this thesis to 
provide an understanding of specific terms as they will influence the developed notional 
negotiation strategy for this thesis.  Today, the term “asymmetrical” is associated with 
both the environment and form of warfare in which the insurgent engages.  This thesis 
will use the Army Field Manual 3-0, Chapter 4, entitled, Fundamentals of Full Spectrum 
Operations, to illustrate the characteristics of the asymmetrical environment and warfare.  
Dissimilarity creates exploitable advantages. Asymmetric engagements 
can be extremely lethal, especially if the target is not ready to defend itself 
against the asymmetric threat. Asymmetry tends to decay over time as 
adversaries adapt to dissimilarities exposed in action. In a larger sense, 
asymmetric warfare seeks to avoid enemy strengths and concentrate 
comparative advantages against relative weaknesses. (Field Manual 3-0, 
2005, 4-109)  
Furthering the aforementioned passage, Dr John Arquilla of the Naval 
Postgraduate School suggests the following in support of symmetrical and asymmetrical 
warfare:  “Bombers worked well in wars in which one Industrial Age military threw steel 
at the other.  World War II, for instance was a match up of roughly symmetrical forces.  
This is not the true today” (Garreau, 2001).  That said, could negotiations counter the 




warfare?  Although a negotiations strategy proved to be a viable additional tool for the 
US in COIN operations against the Philippine insurgency, as well as Rhodesia’s counter 
to the “Patriotic Front,” and France’s counter to the Algerian insurgency, the question 
remains: are states currently engaged in insurgent warfare postured to employ negotiation 
efforts as an additional tool to counter an insurgency and win?  Given the nature of the 
contemporary insurgent, coupled with the asymmetrical battlefield, is it even possible to 
“win”?   
The New College Edition of The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language defines “to win” as the following, “to struggle through to a desired place or 
condition by negotiating” (The American Heritage, 2005, p.1466). By accepting this 
definition, can a state or government maneuver an insurgency into a desired place or 
condition?  
Consider also that in order to achieve its aims, a state must be effective.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines effectiveness, as “1. 
Having the intended or expected effect; serving the purpose” (The American Heritage, 
2005, p.416).  Given this definition of effectiveness, is employing a strategy of kinetic 
and direct action tactics effective when attempting to win a war against an insurgency? Is 
military might serving the desired purpose, which is to win?   
Finally, many senior military leaders and policy makers believe that by 
annihilating the insurgent, the state is influencing the battlefield.  Many critics of this 
ideology strongly disagree.  Nevertheless, the American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language defines influence as the following: “1. A power indirectly or intangibly 
affecting a person or a course of events (The American Heritage, 2005, 674).   
Given the attributes of the asymmetrical battlefield that the insurgent inhabits, the 
author asserts, a serious mind set change, on part of the US policy makers, must take 
place.  That serious mind set must effectively employ unconventional methods against an 
unconventional opponent in order to influence the physical and political environments, 
the local populace and the insurgent.  Only through the employment of an unconventional 




adversary).  The unconventional method that this thesis advocates is the use of a 
negotiation strategy.  Nevertheless, to examine the means in which the previously defined 
terms were utilized while combating an insurgency, this thesis will employ a case study 
methodology.  The approach that this thesis will use to analyze the cases studies will 
mirror the approach employed by (RDML) Bill McRaven in his book, Spec Ops, Case 
Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice.  McRaven used the 
methodology suggested by Liddell Hart when analyzing case studies.  Liddell Hart, 1991) 
asserts the following:  
The method in recent generations has been to select one or two campaigns, 
and to study them exhaustively as a means of professional training and as 
the foundation of military theory.  But with such limited basis the 
continual change in military means from war to war carry danger that our 
outlook will be narrow and lessons fallacious. (Hart, 1991, p.4) 
In efforts to test this thesis’ hypotheses, the author will examine three case 
studies, and identify the common threads that enable a negotiation strategy to work in 
support of countering an insurgency.     
 
D. METHODOLOGY  
As mentioned earlier, this thesis will employ a case study methodology to 
determine the role of a negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency.  Nevertheless, to 
steer the efforts of the case studies, this thesis has developed a conceptual framework, in 
which the findings of the case studies claims will be analyzed.  That said, the 
methodology will examine three case studies, spanning the past 100 years, to determine 
the role of negotiation in countering an insurgency.  The following descriptions will 
briefly familiarize the reader with the reason why the preceding case studies were chosen.  
Given the British public outcry, coupled with the inhumane treatment of South African 
non-combatants, this thesis will examine the Boer War as a case study. 
. . . just like the United States and the French, the British underestimated 






week, and in fact the war lasted for over two years and thousands of 
people lost their lives, just like in the Vietnam War. (ICE Case Studies, 
n.d.)  
The Boer War (1899-1902) was one of the critical contributing factors that 
supported the British public’s outcry on behalf of the British soldier.  Due to guerrilla 
tactics employed by the Boer insurgents, the British soldier was dying at an alarming 
rate-just like his future American counterpart in Vietnam.  Prior to the negotiation efforts, 
the number of British soldiers killed in action exceeded 5700 and deaths attributed to 
disease were over 13,000.  Furthering the contributing factors to peace negotiations were 
the incarceration of innocent Boer women, children and the elderly in British 
concentration camps.  The inhumane conditions of the concentration camps were 
responsible for the deaths of over 25,000 women, children and elderly while in captivity.  
To compound the situation of the Boer, the insurgents felt they could not fight and protect 
their homes at the same time.  Therefore, many Boers terminated their insurgent pursuits 
to protect and take of their families.  The demobilization efforts of a few angered some 
fellow Boers, leading them to commit violent reprisals against their fellow countrymen.  
In turn, the reprisals inspired the Boer to seek peace talks with the British.  Therefore, on 
February 28, 1901 Kitchener (British) and Botha (Boer) launched the first of several 
peace negotiation talks.  
Acknowledging the need for a state to negotiate from a position of power, this 
thesis will also examine the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) as a case study. Although 
the Malayan Emergency lasted twelve years, the negotiation efforts took place during the 
introduction of “The Briggs Plan” in 1950.  The Briggs Plan employed strategic 
communications between the British and the locals, and these communications played a 
critical part in the relocation of “the squatter.”  By relocating the squatter, the logistics 
provided to the insurgent by the squatter, such as food, transportation, etc., were taken 
away.  Along this theme, The Briggs Plan further influenced the local populace, as well 
as the insurgents, through food rationing to cooperate with the state’s desires.  Another 
element of the negotiation strategy was the employment of an amnesty program. This 




agents and informers.  Finally, “The Rewards-For-Surrender Program” focused on 
offering cash either for surrendered insurgents or to people who offered information that 
resulted in the capture of an insurgent  
Given the need to recognize the importance of observing human rights, even in 
time of war, this author has also chosen the El Salvadoran War (1980-1992)as a case 
study. Negotiations played a role from the very beginning of this conflict.  The 
negotiation efforts involved not only the El Salvadoran Government but also neighboring 
countries, the United States and the United Nations.  Throughout the conflict, the military 
footprint remained relatively small with an even smaller advisory element from the 
United States Army Special Forces. Accounts suggest that the FMLN initiated peace 
talks with the El Salvadorian Government to negotiate for the US presence to remain as 
advisors to the El Salvadorian Military, based on the latter’s barbaric tactics employed 
against the insurgent.  The insurgents felt as long as the US provided advisors to the El 
Salvadorian Government, human rights would be enforced. 
Through the examination of these case studies, the chosen methodology will 
demonstrate the varying degrees negotiations played in relation to heavy, moderate and 
light military operations employed to counter an insurgency.  The thesis will also 
examine each case study in three stages.  During stage one, “The Road to War,” the thesis 
will provide the reader with factors that initiated, maintained and ended each conflict.  At 
the end of phase one, the reader will have a general understanding of what started the 
conflict and events that brought the conflict to a negotiation posture.  During stage two, 
“Testing the Thesis’ claims,” the thesis will test the hypotheses against information 
gathered from stage one. During stage three, the methodology will analyze the claims by 
utilizing a conceptual framework.  While implementing the conceptual framework, the 
thesis will reference several publications and articles related to the thesis’ claims to 
further examine the findings gathered from the claims.  Given the information gathered 
from analyzing the claims in conjunction with the defined terms and other publications, 
the thesis will develop a notional negotiation strategy to counter a modern day 




taking place in Iraq.  This thesis chose Iraq as a current case in which to employ a 
notional negotiation strategy because there have been reports that Iraqi insurgents’ 
representatives and US officials have entered into such “talks.”  Yet the reports suggest 
these “talks” have failed to diminish insurgent activity.  Nevertheless, on 27 Jun 2005, it 
was reported that Washington officials and top Commander US Military Commander, 
General George Casey identified “the need to draw the string of revolt with politics.”  
General Casey further observed the preceding need to “draw the string” by stating the 
following, "It (the war) will ultimately be settled by negotiations . . . It will not be settled 
on the battlefield" (MacDonald, 2005). Iraq is, therefore, appropriate as a current case in 
which to employ a notional negotiation strategy.  Given the methodology of this thesis, 
the following chapters will then examine the role negotiations have played and may play 
in the future in countering an insurgency. The following overview will briefly orient the 
reader to the supporting chapters. 
 
E. CHAPTER REVIEW 
Chapter II will identify the studies that comprise the conceptual framework.  This 
conceptual framework will serve as the foundation to develop a notional negotiation 
strategy.  Chapters III (The Boer War) and IV (The Malayan Emergency) and V Chapter 
(The El Salvadorian War), will illustrate the events that enabled the conflict and test the 
thesis’ hypotheses.  Chapter VI will analyze the findings, using the conceptual framework 
to determine the conceptual common threads that enabled successful counter-insurgent 
strategies using negotiations as a non-kinetic weapon.  Chapter VII, the notional 
negotiation strategic development, will examine the information gathered from the 
“Testing the Claims” portion of this thesis.  To guide and direct the notional negotiation 
strategy efforts, the author will utilize a theoretical model.  The model, given the war of 
ideas that fuels an insurgency, will illustrate the information operations portrayal of the 
conditions within the insurgent’s environment.  Furthermore, the author will depict this 
environment by demonstrating the degree of cooperation of the insurgent in relation to 
the degree of coercion employed by the state.  To aid in the development of the 




case studies, publications and articles used to support this thesis.  Furthermore the author 
will address the risks and cost associated with establishing a notional negotiation strategy 
to counter an insurgency.  Finally, given the notional negotiation strategic development, 
the author will provide recommendations on behalf of the employment of the notional 
negotiation strategy.   
That said, it is essential that this thesis determine its conceptual framework.  This 
conceptual framework will enable the reader to understand why the thesis approaches 
specific claims in the manner that it does.  This conceptual framework will feed and 
structure the strategic development of a notional negotiation strategy.   The author will 
derive the conceptual framework from several publications and articles by various 
agencies within the areas of conflict resolution, strategic development, networked warfare 
and social control.  Therefore, the following text will familiarize the reader with those 
publications and articles that will serve as the references by which to analyze the 




























II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis will reference several publications and articles in its efforts to establish 
a conceptual framework.  This conceptual framework will assist in the examination of the 
thesis’ hypotheses and the central question of, “What role do negotiations play in 
defeating an insurgency?”  Further, this conceptual framework will serve as the 
governance and foundation of the notional negotiation strategy developed in Chapter VII.  
The conceptual framework will utilize publications and articles analyzing the 
counterinsurgency strategies used to defeat an insurgency, conflict resolution tactics that 
stabilized an environment, a potential “game theory” applied to each case, and the social 
control mechanisms imposed.  
Although the author has primarily “assigned” publications per each claim, due to 
the abstract nature of asymmetrical warfare, the author has used the same publications 
throughout the conceptual framework.  In an effort to examine the counterinsurgency 
techniques employed during the cases, this thesis will utilize Che Guevara’s, On 
Guerrilla Warfare.  Guevara’s work, although ostensibly dated, has arguably provided 
the foundation and inspiration to insurgencies past and present.  Therefore, while 
examining the claims of this thesis, Guevara’s work will serve as a counter-insurgency 
guide to assessing the efforts employed by the state to defeat the insurgency.  Closely 
related material such as Roger W. Barnett’s Asymmetrical Warfare will be referenced in 
further examining the state’s approach to countering an insurgency within the 
asymmetrical environment.  In addition, while examining the strategic employment of a 
negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency, this thesis will use readings from Anthony 
D. McIvor’s Rethinking the Principles of War.  While using McIvor’s work, this thesis 
will focus on the following chapters: Steven Metz’s “Small Wars: From Low Intensity 
Conflict to Irregular Challenges” and Frank G. Hoffman’s “Principles of the Savage 
Wars of Peace.”   
When analyzing the conflict resolution techniques employed to stabilize an 




Postgraduate School in 1995 entitled, El Salvador: An Example of Conflict Resolution.  
Although written in support of the El Salvadorian conflict, Blandon’s examination of the 
mechanisms that served to stabilize the environment will assist this thesis in determining 
the conflict resolution approach employed by the state in each case.   
Along the theme of conflict resolution, the thesis will employ two works by 
William Ury:, Getting Past No, and the second, co-authored by Roger Fisher,and Patton, 
Getting to Yes.  Together these publications examine the art of negotiating without 
“giving in” and the means of finding the “comfort zone” between two opposing forces.  
The author will analyze the “game theory” that could have enabled the insurgent or the 
state to predict the other’s next move, threat or promise, this thesis will cite Robert 
Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation.  Using Axelrod’s work, the thesis will examine 
the characteristics associated with the “Prisoner’s (Insurgent’s) Dilemma” and assess 
whether the negotiation strategy was employed in a “step by step” iterative manner. In 
addition, The Evolution of Cooperation will assist in determining the degrees of 
cooperation in relation to coercive tactics employed to initiate and maintain a negotiation 
strategy.   
In terms of blending and balancing a proportionate level of factors essential for a 
negotiation strategy, this thesis will measure its claims against Avinash K. Dixit and 
Barry J. Nalebuff’s, Thinking Strategically, with emphasis on the authors’ outlook on 
cooperation and coordination. 
While examining social control mechanisms, this thesis will employ Malcolm 
Gladwell’s Tipping Point to identify, “The Power of the Few” theory, consisting of 
salesman, mavens, and connectors (key people) that enabled the negotiation process.  
Further, this thesis will examine what Gladwell would term “The Stickiness Factor” of 
the message that influences the populace and the insurgent.  A final concept that this 
thesis will employ in it conceptual framework is Gladwell’s “Power of Content.”  The 
Power of Content will suggest the best time or situation to employ a negotiation strategy.  





“The counter epidemic strategy” by Paul Stares and Mona Yacoubian of the United 
States Institute for Peace to determine if a compartmented approach was taken to enable 
negotiation efforts.  
In addition to the aforementioned publications, this conceptual framework will 
employ, in a supplemental fashion, relevant counter-terrorism concepts and practices 
from the following authors: Bernard Lewis’ article in the Atlantic Monthly, “The Roots of 
Muslim Rage,” Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God, and Marc Sageman’s 
Understanding Terror Networks.  Along the theme of counter-terrorism, the author of this 
thesis will employ works from John Arquilla to further structure the conceptual 
framework of the thesis.  Given Arquilla’s extensive work in the field of counter-
terrorism, NETWAR and “swarming,” this thesis will examine the employment of a 
negotiation strategy in a “swarm-like” fashion. In conjunction with the aforementioned 
conceptual framework, this thesis will employ the defined terms in Chapter I to direct the 
ends, ways and means associated with developing a notional negotiation strategy.   
To enable the conceptual framework and determine the commonalities of a 
negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency, this thesis will examine three case studies 
spanning a period of 100 years.  Each study will provide the reader with the insights into 
the origin of the problem, the conflict, and the settlement through negotiations.  In 
addition, this thesis will show the military force “foot print” in relation to negotiation 
efforts that took place in each case.  This thesis will illustrate, within an irregular warfare 
environment, that “determining the non-kinetic approach first” (Lambert, 2005, 
PowerPoint briefing: email distribution correspondence from Major Robert Greenway, 
Office of Secretary of Defense-Policy) can lessen the military force package needed to 
defeat a networked adversary.  The non-kinetic approach that this thesis advocates is the 
uses of a negotiation strategy given an irregular warfare environment.  
That said, the Anglo-Boer War (1898-1902) initially resembled much more of a 
conventional fight between state sponsored militaries.  However, the technologically 
advanced, professional British Army had the force advantage in comparison to the Boer 




Farmers, to resort to guerrilla tactics.  Therefore, the case of the Anglo-Boer War (1898-
1902) will demonstrate a heavy emphasis on the military force and coercive tactics 
exemplified by the British in relation to the relatively light negotiation effort that took 
place, securing the British’s defeat of the Boer insurgent, but also explaining their 





III. THE ANGLO-ANGLO-BOER WAR (1898–1902) 
A. THE ROAD TO WAR 
In the 1880s, the mineral rich environment of  Transvaal, South Africa fostered a 
gold rush that attracted, as native Boers would call them, Uitlanders (foreigners) from 
Great Britain to Australia.  These Uitlanders “occupied” Transvaal, South Africa, 
continuing their quest for gold.  Although the Uitlanders multiplied at an alarming rate in 
Transvaal and paid taxes to Transvaal, they did not have the right to vote.  The Boers 
employed this tactic to ensure they retained political control of Transvaal.  "Things 
finally came to a head in May 1899 when a conference was held in Bloemfontein in an 
attempt to resolve the most recent points of the contention" (Lee, 1985, p.19).  One of the 
topics discussed was how long it would take until the Uitlander could vote in Transvaal.  
Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the Transvaal Republic, suggested that the waiting 
period should be approximately 15 years.  Kruger’s suggestion was immediately 
dismissed by Sir Alfred Milner, the British High commissioner for South Africa, 
demanding that the Uitlander’s right to vote must be exercised immediately, after which 
he abruptly concluded the meeting.  Upon hearing the demand of Milner,    
Kruger, (his) eyes watering . . .  stood there for the last time repeating. ‘It 
is our country you want.’  Milner had closed the proceedings with the 
chilling words: “This conference is absolutely at the end, and there is no 
obligation on either side arising from it.”  (Pakenham, 1979, p 65) 
After the Bloemfontein Conference, events such as military movement of British 
forces posturing on the Transvaal border forced Kruger to make an ultimatum to the 
British.  Kruger’s ultimatum consisted of pleas to the British Cabinet to withdraw their 
forces from the Transvaal boarder.  The British Cabinet did not comply with the 
ultimatum; as a result, the British Cabinet declared war against the Boers on October 9, 
1899.  Although the initial British military elements were few, “The total British military 
strength in South Africa reached nearly 500,000 men, whereas the Boers could muster no 




The approach to warfare by the highly technical, professionalized army of the 
British was drastically different from that by the farmers of Transvaal of the Boer Army.  
Most British officers saw this war “as an extension of their activities on the cricket or 
polo field, combined with the excitement of a grouse shoot”   (Lee, 1985, p31). The 
British military believed no one could defeat the “mighty British Army,” especially a 
bunch of South African Dutch farmers.  This nonchalant attitude was pervasive 
throughout the British military to the point that “there was little or no training in 
marksmanship . . . view[ing] the use of camouflage as not sportsmanlike”(ICE Case 
Studies, n.d.).  There was a common belief that the force superior British would dominant 
the Boers, making short order of the Boer in less than six months.  Nevertheless, in 
contrast to the British, the Boer, although at a numerical disadvantage, seized every 
opportunity to sharpen their skills for combat.  Knowing that it would take six weeks for 
British Troops to move from their command post to Transvaal, the Boers refined their 
marksmanship skills.  Accounts suggest that the Boers could engage targets up to 1,200 
feet.   
Early in the War, the Boers fought conventionally and were beaten.  This 
condition influenced the Boer to shift from conventional to guerrilla warfare.  
Nevertheless, based on the resource shortages, the "burgher" (the Boer soldier) was 
“expected to provide himself with a rife, ammunition and sufficient food to last for eight 
days.”  (ICE Case Studies, n.d.)  The burgher organized into small “commando teams” 
employing hit and run tactics against the formalized British Army, causing massive 
attrition in the British Army.  Given both the miscalculation by the British Army, and the 
highly successful guerrilla tactics of hit and run, coupled with expert marksmanship, the 
Boer guerrilla met with unprecedented success on the field of battle, accounting for 
thousands of British Soldiers killed in action.   
The Boers’ success facilitated a massive public out cry by the British civil 
populace; it appeared that the Boer had achieved a stalemate against the powerful British 
Army.  Although it appeared that the Boer guerrillas’ tactics employed against the British 




employed by the British framed the battlefield for victory.  In light of this approach, some 
of the Boers “demobilized” in efforts to take care of their families and farms.  In doing 
so, many Boer guerrillas became disenchanted with those who demobilized, and, in some 
cases, conducted violent reprisals against them.  Being influenced by the preceding 
factors, on February 28, 1901, “Kitchener (British) and Botha (Boer) launched the first of 
several peace negotiation talks at Middelburg” (Farwell, 1976, p. 393).  However to re-
enforce this framework, the following activities took place to ensure a military victory 
Lord Kitchener, the British commander, now changed tactics to "clean up" 
a war which most considered already won.  He ordered a new kind of war 
– a war of total destruction and ruthlessness against a whole people.  That 
meant destroying all livestock and crops, burning down the Boer farms 
and herding the women and children into concentration camps. (Weber, 
n.d.) 
The total number of civilians who died in the concentration camps number 
approximately 26,000. Although incidents such as guerrilla reprisals in response to 
demobilization efforts by former Boer guerrillas, and minor grumbling by British military 
officers against the peace negotiations occurred, they were not significant enough to 
derail the peace negotiation process.  On May 31, 1902, given the degree of cooperation 
by both the British and Boer Governments, the peace treaty of Vereeniging at Melrose 
House in Pretoria was signed.  At the completion of the war, approximately 22,000 
British soldiers had been killed in action and 13,000 had died from disease.  
Approximately 7,000 Boer guerrillas were also killed in action.  Although the British 
employed coercive tactics to defeat the Boer guerrilla, the signing of the peace treaty of 
Vereeniging, arguably, foreshadowed the British’s dominating reign and enabled South 
Africa eventually to liberate itself from British control.  
 
B. TESTING THE CLAIMS 
Negotiation implies weakness, encouraging further violence. 
Employing a negotiation strategy did not imply weakness, nor did it inspire 
noteworthy violence that had an effect on the negotiation process.  At the point when 




state, although having suffered tremendous casualties, was in a position to influence the 
Boer’s leadership.  This position of influence struck directly at the “heart” of the Boer 
guerrilla, his family, his home and his livelihood.  Although the British Army sustained 
close to 35,000 casualties, the concentration camps appeared to have had a psychological 
effect on the Boer guerrilla.  It is suggested that the establishment of the concentration 
camps put the British Army Leadership in an immoral and unethical light, not only within 
the international community but with British public at large. However, the camps 
arguably put the British Government in a position of power to steer and re-enforce the 
negotiation efforts.  Once the negotiation efforts were taking place, no notable violent 
activities took place. 
 
Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership. 
Given that the Boer combatants were the military of the state and already had a 
hierarchal command structure, the leadership and mechanisms needed to facilitate a 
negotiation process were in place.  As demonstrated in the “Road to War” section of this 
chapter, Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the Boer armies, conducted 
negotiation efforts for peace with Field Marshal Lord Herbert Kitchener Commander-in-
Chief of the African Army.  When both sides communicated with their subordinates, the 
hierarchic chain of command made negotiations a little easier than attempting to 
negotiate with a decentralized, leaderless, networked adversary. 
 
The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal 
efforts by non-compliant actors. 
The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy did outlast violent reprisals by 
non compliant actors.  As mentioned previously, violent reprisals and major opposition to 
the negotiations for peace were not relevant issues to consider during the negotiation 
process.  Public outcry, miscalculation of the adversary, and other oversights made the 
British Government receptive to the plan.  Conversely, the Boers’ way of life as farmers 
was being destroyed incrementally, and the death of approximately 26,000 Boer non-




British to a negotiation strategy.  Therefore, reprisals of any sort were ineffective in 
derailing the good faith negotiations for peace. 
 
Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through 
an iterative process. 
Given the iterative process which speaks to a give and take, loser and winner 
environment, the author believes the cooperation between insurgent and state was 
conducted in such a manner.  The dilemma facing the Boer guerrilla was either to 
continue to fight the British and watch more non-combatants die in concentration camps, 
or concede to a negation process.  Knowing this, the Boer guerrilla conceded to the 
demands of the negation strategy and peace accords.  However, the negotiations for peace 
were not embraced by all initially; this process saw many attempts before the 
negotiations took hold on the Boer guerrilla.  The end state of the negotiation for peace 
resulted in the Boer and British Governments signing the peace treaty of Vereeniging at 
Melrose House.  After the peace treaty of Vereeniging was signed, a cease fire took place 
and was never broken. 
 
Negotiation works when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation. 
The author believes that the equal blend of cooperation and coercion is what 
defeated the Boer insurgent.  Although the British had the force advantage, the Boer’s 
employment of guerrilla warfare, arguably, appeared to be too much for the British Force.  
The massive attrition of British Soldiers fostered an international outcry by the British 
public.   In light of the outcry and efforts to enter and sustain negotiations for peace, 
concentration camps were established to coerce the Boer guerrilla to cooperate.  
Although perceived as immoral and unethical by the population of Great Britain and 
throughout the international community, the British Forces maintained this posture to 
ensure compliance and cooperation.  The establishment of the concentration camps 








Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals. 
The opposing state militaries, commanders of each military were the key 
individuals who facilitated the negotiations for peace.  The two opposing commanders, 
Kitchener (British) and Botha (Boer), appeared to be the “connectors” who had the power  
to motivate their units in any manner necessary.  Kitchener and Botha, both leaders in 
organizations of hieratical structures, were the key individuals that facilitated the 
negation for peace process. 
 
Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not 
require overall linkages 
The separation of non-combatants who were considered sympathizers for the 
guerrillas served as the compartmented strategy that facilitated negotiations.  Abstractly, 
one could look at the employment of the concentration camp as a percipient that 
influenced and maintained the negotiation process.  By “compartmentalizing” the 
sympathetic population, the Boer guerrilla was forced to comply even more so with the 
negotiation process.  Further, by “compartmentalizing” the populace, some Boer 
guerrillas demobilized, undermining the insurgent’s goals.  Given the proceeding 
information, arguably, the concentration camps served as a method to force the Boer 
guerrilla into negations and demobilization efforts.  
In light of the data collected in support of “testing the claims” of the Anglo-
Anglo-Boer War, it appears that negotiation played role in countering the insurgency and 
stabilizing the environment.  However, it appears the negotiation efforts were facilitated 
and enforced by the proper blend of coercion by the state and cooperation on the 
insurgent.  That said, in the next case, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), prior to 
“The Emergency” a mechanism of negotiations was already established between the 
British and Malayan insurgent.  Given the mechanism of negotiation, coupled with 
familiarity, the British Army believed the force needed to stabilize the environment by 
defeating the insurgency would be on a lesser scale than the Anglo-Boer War.  Although 
the aforementioned factors favored the British Army, the British relied on military might, 




will illustrate the failure associated with not employing a negotiation strategy in an 
irregular warfare environment.  Also, this case will illustrate that, within an irregular 
warfare environment, irregular tactics and techniques are necessary to defeat the 






























IV. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960) 
A. THE ROAD TO WAR 
During the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December of 1941, the British 
Government provided military and logistical support to the Malayan Government. As part 
of the support that the British provided the Malayan Government, the latter was 
instructed in how to employ a strategy of guerrilla warfare.   Although the British Forces’ 
efforts were in vain in defeating the Japanese, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 
which fought alongside the British, upon defeat reformed the MCP into the Malayan 
Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).  Even through the British government provided 
support in efforts to combat the Japanese invasion, “the restoration of British rule clearly 
had no part in the MCP’s agenda” (Komer, 1972, p.3).  The reluctance to comply with 
British Rule was evident during demobilization efforts.  As a whole, the MPAJA viewed 
the British surrender to the Japanese in 1942 as cowardly and dishonorable to the 
Malayan People.  This atmosphere made negotiation efforts to demobilize the Malayan 
guerrillas more difficult.  Although in many areas the MPAJA turned sizable numbers of 
weapons back into the British government, after the war, “weapons such as Sten guns, 
carbines, pistols, and revolvers were undoubtedly held back” (Komer, 1972, p.5).  
Nevertheless, after negotiations and demobilization efforts of the MPAJA, the MCP 
“replaced it [MPAJA] with a number of front organizations of a traditional Communist 
character” (Komer, 1972, p.5).   
The MCP recognized that in order to be an effective communist group in Malaya, 
the MCP must control the trade unions and federations that fostered the financial growth 
of the country.  Therefore, in efforts to collapse the capitalistic economy of Malaya, the 
MCP organized several strikes, coupled with acts of terrorism to derail trade agreements. 
Alarming to the state, both tactics had considerable impact on the state’s ability to trade.  
On June 19, 1947, the Government of Malaya declared a state of emergency after more 
such activities and the killing of several high profile members within the agricultural 




republic by August 3, 1948. A significant element that sustained the fight was the 
guerrilla’s ability to exploit the unconventional warfare skills taught prior to the Japanese 
invasion. Also, the guerrillas took refuge in the jungles of Malaya alongside the 
dislocated “squatter” who also occupied the jungle.  Based on the dysfunctional 
economic conditions of the state, the “squatter” was forced to the jungles to feed and 
provide shelter to his families.  This added dimension of the squatter arguably provided 
several things to the Malayan guerrilla: food, security (early warning) and a base for 
recruitment.  The British and Malayan government response to the MCP’s activity was 
initially slow and ineffective in combating the Malayan guerrilla.  The MCP’s ability to 
sustain itself in the jungle through the squatter was the MCP’s greatest advantage.  
However another advantage that the MCP employed in the jungle, through the use of the 
squatter, was to transform the entire jungle into a “kill zone” for British and Malayan 
soldiers.  The numbers of the British soldiers who were committed to the Malayan 
Emergency numbered approximately 35,000, and the Malayan government committed 
approximately 100,000 soldiers to the Emergency.  Although, the state employed a 
sizable number of soldiers and assets to the conflict, through the uses of the jungle and 
the squatter, the MCP numbering approximately 80,000 was dangerously effective 
against the state. (The aforementioned approximate figures are from the beginning to the 
end of the Malayan Emergency.)   
What is unique about this case is that the British and Malayan governments had 
conducted negotiation efforts with the MCP in efforts to demobilize right after the 
Japanese conflict.  Therefore, the atmosphere to negotiate with the insurgent should have 
been more permissive than going into a negotiation process “cold.”  Nevertheless, the 
British counterinsurgency operations resembled raids and ambushes that achieved less 
than decisive successes.  The British utilized these tactics for seven years in efforts to 
defeat the Malayan guerrillas.  Nonetheless, observing the ineffective tactics employed 
by the British army, General Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations, instituted a 






and facilitated critical direct action operations responsible for defeating the insurgency.  
The indirect action method employed was entitled “The Briggs Plan” and consisted of the 
following:   
1. to dominant the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete 
security therein which in time result in a steady and increase flow of 
information coming in from all sources 
2. to break up the communists within the populated areas 
3. to isolate the bandits from their food and information supply organizations 
which are in the populated areas 
4. to destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.    
(Barber, 1971, p 97) 
 
General Briggs, knowing the jungle provided the insurgent a safe haven and that 
squatters provided the guerrillas with an essential logistics base, initially focused his 
efforts on separating the squatter from the jungle, and transforming the jungle from a safe 
haven into a quagmire of death for the insurgents that inhabited it.  Other variables that 
enabled the defeat of the Malayan insurgent were amnesty programs, employment of 
former insurgents by the government of Malaya as interrogators and/ or intelligence 
agents, and the rewards-for-surrender program.  Faced with the combined impact of these 
programs, the remaining insurgents had two options: either comply with the demands of 
the state or continue to fight and risk being killed.  The success of the Briggs plan along 
with precise direct action operations facilitated the defeat of the Malayan Guerrilla by 
July 31, 1960.  At the completion of the Emergency, 6,710 MRLA guerillas were killed 
and 1,287 were captured. In addition, “2,702 guerrillas surrendered during the conflict 
and about 500 at the end of the conflict. There were 1,346 Malayan troops and 519 
British military personnel killed. 2,478 civilians were killed and 810 missing as a result 
of the conflict.” (Malayan Emergency, n.d.)  Given the outcome of the Malayan 
Emergency, it appears that the state’s ability to counter the insurgency was more 
decisive.  Although the outcome of the Malayan Emergency was more decisive than the 
preceding case study, the method in which the negotiation efforts took place was 





B. TESTING THE CLAIMS 
Negotiation implies weakness, encouraging further violence. 
Formal negotiations did not take place. The absence of formal negotiation efforts 
imply that the negotiation efforts were conducted in a tacit manner. In part, the incentive-
based environment facilitated by The Briggs Plan inherently negotiated and sold itself.  
The Briggs Plan gave the local and insurgent populace a decision to make, either fight 
and starve or comply, eat and live in peace.  Therefore, The Briggs Plan can not be seen 
as furthering the perception of the state as being weak.  Also, without the logical and 
intelligence support base that the squatter provided, retaliation efforts to derail The 
Briggs Plan were in vain and actually met the intent of The Briggs Plan “to destroy the 
bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.” 
 
Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership. 
Given the decentralized, networked manner in which the Malayan guerrilla 
fought, the central leadership was not available to negotiate with.  However, the populace 
was the center of gravity for the insurgency; the local populace and squatter constituted a 
central “mass.”  A prime example of this was the rewards-for-surrender program, where 
the local populace was “negotiated” with through the form of an incentive (money).  
Further, some “soft core” insurgents were influenced by turning themselves in for 
amnesty.  Although the asymmetrical, decentralized manner in which the adversary 
fought did not required a central leader, other attributes throughout the environment 
proved to be equally as effective. 
 
The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal 
efforts by non-compliant actors. 
The incentive to comply with The Briggs Plan, given the state’s ability to live up 
to its portion of the agreement, made the environment for the insurgent very difficult.  
During the execution of The Briggs Plan, violent reprisals were not the intentions of the 




of the insurgents were focused on survival, i.e.: procuring food and evading the “special 
forces” that were masters of the jungle and killing.  
 
Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through 
an iterative process. 
Given the "Insurgents Dilemma,” the Malayan guerrilla faced two options: (1) 
fight, die and/ or starve, or (2) comply with the Briggs Plan and live.  In an iterative 
fashion, the Briggs Plan removed the support and intelligence to the Malayan guerrilla by 
relocating the squatter.  Then introducing both the reward-for-surrender and amnesty 
programs to the insurgents through incremental cooperation to the demands of the Briggs 
Plan, the remaining “hard core” insurgents were forced to fight and die.  An extreme 
minority of the hard core insurgent, who did not comply nor fight the British, fled north. 
 
Negotiation works when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation. 
The Malayan Emergency provides and excellent example of the success achieved 
when an equal blend of coercion is applied in relation to cooperation.  Pre-Briggs Plan, 
the state employed direct action against targets that had the information and 
environmental advantage over the British; consequently these conditions favored the 
insurgent.  Nevertheless, the Briggs Plan used food rationing, social control, and 
asymmetric negotiation techniques forcing the local to face the inner conflict, given what 
the insurgency can provide vs. what the state can provide that indirectly coerced the 
insurgent and sympathizer into a cooperative state. The coercive element within the 
Briggs Plan was not derived from employing direct action against the enemy.  Coercion 
and direct action were the byproducts of the Briggs Plan.  Coercion was in the form of 
not only food rationing and social control but, also in the incentives, amnesties and fears 
that the covert veil under which the insurgent operated for so long could, at any minute 
come tumbling down.  The aforementioned conditions provided the coercion needed for 








Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals. 
Given the asymmetric environment in which the Malayan guerrilla operated, there 
were no key individuals that facilitated negotiations.  Nevertheless, through tacit 
negotiation efforts, the state focused their good faith negotiations onto the local populace 
and reformed insurgents.  The negotiation effort was really asymmetrical in nature; 
because the tacit negotiations took place in each person individually in the form of a 
decision to either comply with “the plan” or continue to defect and support the guerrillas.  
Within this environment, local people/ squatters, reformed insurgents and their 
“neighborhoods” facilitated the inner negotiation process within themselves with the 
assistance of a strong information operation campaign. 
 
Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not 
require overall linkages. 
Although the “negotiation strategy” was not employed in a compartmentalized 
fashion, the relocation of squatters formed a compartmented “cell.”  Compliance with 
The Briggs Plan by former insurgents, who later worked for the government as 
interrogators or intelligence source, formed another “cell.”  That said, indirectly, the 
“negotiation strategy” was executed in a compartmentalized fashion with the overall 
intent to defeat the insurgency.  These “cells” formed a network; arguably, these cells 
“seized” critical physical space of the “hard core” insurgent.  Further these “cells” 
enabled accurate direct action operations which added to the defeat of the “hard core” 
insurgent. 
The preceding claims and data of the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) illustrate 
the ability to effectively employ a “compartmented,” and a self imposed negotiation 
strategy.  Although the mechanism of “face to face” negotiations was not present, the 
British approach (initially direct action) to this conflict coupled with the insurgent’s 
support system and physical environment made the task of “face to face” negotiations 
literally impossible. That said, in relation to the Anglo-Boer War, the British Army’s 
footprint was considerably lessened based on the utilizing innovative methods to defeat 




insurgent was ready to negotiate from the inception of war, and the willingness to 
negotiate from the beginning of a civil war can have an impact on the military “foot 
print” required to defeat an insurgency.  Given certain environmental and political 
factors, however, these negotiations faltered.  Therefore, as a mechanism for negotiations, 
the insurgent would employ violence to force the state to the negotiation table.  In that 
regard, the following chapter will illustrate the events which led to the El Salvadorian 




























V. EL SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR (1980–1992) 
A. THE ROAD TO WAR 
From the early 1930s to the early 1990s, El Salvador endured authoritarian 
governments that featured political repression and allowed only limited political reform.  
Although El Salvador claimed to be a democracy, enormous human rights violations and 
atrositicies were committed against the people of El Salvador by the military.  Events 
such as human rights violations and political repression were the incipient cause that led 
to the formation of The Farabundo Marti’ National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the late 
1970s.  In response to the inhumane treatment, the FMLN, on January 10, 1981, 
conducted an attack on the El Salvadorian Government Forces, ESAF, in efforts to 
destabilize the current government structure of El Salvador.   
Although violent exchanges took place between the El Salvadorian Government 
and the FMLN, “in August 1981, France and Mexico formally recognized the FMLN as a 
representative political force and called for a negotiation settlement between the warning 
factions (“El Salvador,” 2001).  Negotiation efforts between the state and insurgent took 
place, arguably, prior to the “official” establishment of the FMLN.  The initial 
negotiation for peace, headed by President Duarte, was perceived as weak and uncertain.  
These conditions fostered further insurgent violence.  Nevertheless, the peace process, 
later headed by President Cristiani, was looked upon by the insurgent as one of more 
integrity and “good faith.”  The pressure from the international community to resolve the 
differences between the FMLN and El Salvadorian Government influenced the “President 
Cristiani Negotiation Process (1988-1992)” (Blandon, 1995, p.79).  The first of twenty 
negotiation attempts to bring an end to the war through direct talks with the FMLN began 
in Mexico City on September 13, 1989.  Although movement toward a peace settlement 
was taking place, the FMLN, on November 11, 1989 conducted violent offensive 
operations against the capital city San Salvador in which hundreds of people died.  In 
response to the insurgents’ success at San Salvador and the momentum of the negotiation 




gain further support from the government and supporting allies, stepped up their 
counterinsurgency efforts.  Four days later, six Jesuit priests and their two servants were 
shot and killed by the special military force called "Atlacatl Batallion."   The purpose of 
killing the Jesuit priests was to frame the FMLN and derail the peace negoitations; 
however, this tactic was unsuccessful.  The killing and conspiracy surrounding the Jesuit 
priests provoked international outrage, an international investigation, and threats to cutoff 
in military aid from the U.S. Ironically, the threat of terminating military aid to the state 
was not the intent of the FMLN.  The United States Special Forces enhanced amd 
enforced human rights treatment to the local populace and the insurgents.  By losing the 
US sponsored aid, the potential of revitalizing an enviornment inconsistent with human 
rights was probable.  In 1989, the FMLN conducted “The Final Offensive” against the 
capital city of San Salvador.  Although the FMLN’s approach to the “The Final 
Offensive” was tenacious in nature, the FMLN were defeated.  “The Final Offensive,” 
along with threat of the United States of withdrawal, based on flagrant human rights 
violations, inspired the government of El Salvador to again enter into peace negotiations 
that were mediated by the United Nations.   
Many historians of the El Salvadorian civil war suggest that “The Final 
Offensive” was not to take over the country, but in response to the government of El 
Salvador’s reluctance to negotiate with the FMLN insurgents.  On September 25, 1991, 
the two sides signed the “Agreements of New York.” This document influenced “the 
FMLN . . . to drop its commitment to end the armed conflict by force” (Blandon, 1995, 
p.85). On December 31, 1991, the government and the FMLN initialed a peace 
agreement under the supervision and guidance of the UN Secretary.  Although major 
strides were taking place in support of the peace process, many middle level commanders 
of the FMLN were not in compliance with demobilzation. The final agreement, called the 
Chapultepec Peace Accords, was signed in Mexico City on January 16, 1992.  A nine-
month cease-fire took effect February 1, 1992, and was never broken. On December 15, 
1992, a ceremony was held, marking the official end of the conflict between the FMLN 
and the government of El Salvador.  During the cermony demobilization took place, 




Accords between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN resulted in the surrender 
of the FMLN and dismissal of 102 El Salvadorian Military Officers.  ”At the completion 
of the civil war, it is estimated that a total of 45,000 El Salvadorian regular, irregular and 
security forces were committed to the conflict” (Deng Deng, 2001).  “In relation to the 
state, it is estimated that the FMLN insurgent’s strength was 12,000 in 1983.  
Nevertheless, from 1983-1985 it was estimated that the number of insurgents dropped 
from 12,000 to 5,000” (Montes, 1988). 
 
B. TESTING THE CLAIMS 
Negotiation implies weakness, encouraging further violence. 
Although President Duarte was perceived as weak, the El Salvadoran government 
overall was not viewed as weak.  This perception of the El Salvadoran government was 
galvanized by the desire of the insurgent to negotiate with the state from the beginning of 
the war.  The state’s failure to negotiate with the FMLN facilitated and created conditions 
of terror and more insurgent violence.  The FMLN’s willingness to negotiate for peace, 
human rights, and political equity, arguably, was their intent and the incipient reason for 
the war. As mentioned, the FMLN engaged in the Final Offensive in efforts to influence 
the El Salvadoran Government and Military to the negotiation table.  The Final Offensive 
was not a unique occurrence.  Experts such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, a former military 
advisor during El Salvador and current Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey CA, suggests that the majority of the violent insurgent attacks were instigated 
to foster a negotiation environment.  Therefore, the government, by conducting 
negotiation efforts with the FMLN, was not perceived as weak at a local or international 
level, but rather viewed as ethical and morally strong.  This perception is what, arguably, 
put the state on the road to winning.  Therefore the state’s negotiation efforts were fully 
embraced by the FMLN.  As mentioned, after the “Chapultapec Peace Accords” was 








Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership. 
The aforementioned claim is incorrect.  Although the FMLN was an insurgent 
organization, it was organized around “blocks” and “fronts,” resembling a soviet 
structure. This being the case, the spokesperson and commander of FMLN was Shafik 
Handal.  Handal spearheaded the majority of negotiation efforts on the behalf of the 
FMLN.  Handal not only negotiated within El Salvador, he also facilitated negotiation 
efforts internationally.  In light of the aforementioned observation, the unilateral structure 
of the FMLN facilitated successful negotiation efforts. 
 
The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal 
efforts by non-compliant actors. 
In this case, an example of the persistence of good faith negotiation efforts 
outlasting violent reprisals can be found during the El Salvadorian Civil War when the El 
Salvadorian Military executed the Jesuit priests and their servants.  The intent of this 
execution was to frame the insurgents, given the close relationship that the Jesuit priests 
had with the insurgents and the El Salvadorian government.  Nevertheless, to demonstrate 
an act in good faith, President Cristiani sought to bring those to justice who committed 
the act, and he did.  Before, during, and after the slaughter of the Jesuit priests, the 
Government of El Salvador and the international community tirelessly employed methods 
of negotiation to stabilize the environment.  President Cristiani and FMLN’s negotiation 
efforts proved to be too persistent for activities inconsistent to peace to prevent the 
process. 
 
Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through 
an iterative process. 
In this case, although the FMLN iteratively “submitted” to the will of the states 
and international community, by doing so, the FMLN received the human rights 
recognition and political legitimacy it desired.  Examining the “Insurgent’s Dilemma” 
suggests that the insurgents wanted to cooperate on some level throughout the entire war.  
However, initially the unwillingness of the state to negotiate overtly forced the insurgent 




the case, in addition to other outside influences, the state and the military were forced to 
the negotiation table.  The consequence was that the FMLN cooperated, resulting in total 
surrender and the state agreeing to a cease fire, further resulting in the dismissal of 
several high level military officers.  Therefore, given the terms of the negotiation process, 
it appears that the insurgents lost the war and the state won.  However, by losing and 
complying with the terms of the surrender, the FMLN in defeat, was recognized as a 
legitimate political party and, since the surrender, has held political offices in El 
Salvador. 
 
Negotiation works when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation. 
This case presents a unique circumstance to the aforementioned claim.  The state 
and military in El Salvador during the time of the insurgency were two separate entities, 
unlike the United States relationship between the government and the military.  
Therefore, the state and the international community attempted to employ methods of 
negotiation from the Executive Branch to the insurgents and their commanders.  
Conversely, the El Salvadorian Military employed tactics of coercion and violence 
against the insurgents, sympathizers, and, arguably, the innocent in efforts to defeat the 
insurgency.  Thus, the insurgent was faced with a very unique situation. On one hand, the 
state was fostering negotiation efforts.  On the other, the military was pursing coercive 
and violent activities against the insurgents.  Nevertheless, the persistence of the state’s 
negotiation attempts, coupled with an international investigation, allowed the state’s 
efforts to eventually outweigh the military force being applied to the insurgents. 
Therefore, the balance between coercion and cooperation, at times, favored heavy 
violence and coercion.  However, given a dynamic event such as the killing of the Jesuit 
priests, the state and international community employed coercion against the El 







Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals. 
In this case, given the willingness to negotiate of the insurgents, coupled with the 
willingness to negotiate by the state and international community, this thesis will suggest 
that key people facilitated negotiations between the insurgents and the state.  Shafik 
Handal, commander and leader of the FMLN, initiated talks with policy and law makers 
in El Salvador and in the international community.  Presidents Jose Napolean Duarte and 
Alfredo Cristiani facilitated the negotiations for peace with the FMLN insurgents and 
often consulted with the United Nations for advice on peace settlements.  Finally, 
Congressman (MA.) Joe Moakley’s investigation and report of the slaying and alleged El 
Salvadorian Military cover-up of six Jesuit priests and their two servants provided the 
international community the leverage to put an end to armed conflict in El Salvador. 
 
Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not 
require overall linkages. 
In this case, the choice to employ a compartmentalized strategy was not employed 
to defeat the insurgency. There are no accounts suggesting any conventional or non-
conventional means by which the state employed a compartmentalized strategy.  One 
would assume that the method of employing a compartmentalized negotiation strategy 
was not necessary, based upon the willingness of the FMLN to comply with negotiations 
for human rights, equality and peace.  
Having completed the “Road to War” and the “Testing of the Claims” sections for 
each case study, this thesis will now determine what claims stood and which did not 
against the information gathered in each case study.  The following chart will 




Table 1.   Summarized Results of the Claims 
 











No, negotiation efforts 
were welcomed by both 
parties (-) 
No evidence, yet the 
case study did not 
suggest that weakness 
was perceived(-) 
No, the insurgents 






because of their 
lack of central 
leadership 
No, formal negotiation 
efforts took place (-) 
No leadership to 
negotiate with; 
therefore, Tacit 
negotiation efforts took 
place through the 
populace (+) 
No, formal negotiation 
efforts took place (-) 
 
3. The persistence 
of a good faith 
negotiation strategy 
can outlast violent 
reprisals efforts by 
non-compliant 
actors  
Yes, the negotiation 
efforts outlasted the non-
compliant actors on each 
side (+) 
Yes, tacit negotiation 
efforts outlasted the 
insurgent’s violent 
reprisals (-) 
Initially, the negotiation 
efforts were weak; 
however, good faith 
negotiation efforts out 





between state and 
insurgents, “step by 
step” through an 
iterative process 
No, the negotiation 
process was not 
conducted in an iterative 
manner (-) 
Yes, the relocation of 
the squatters, followed 
by the amnesty 
programs suggests 
negotiation were 
conducted in an iterative 
manner (+) 
Yes, the state employed 
negotiation efforts in an 
iterative manner, until 
forced by the 
international commit 
constant attention to the 
peace talks  (+)  
 
5. Negotiations 
work when there is 
an equal blend of 
coercion and 
cooperation 
Yes, the employment of 
the concentration camp 
enabled further 
cooperation between the 
Boers and British (-) 
Yes, the rationing of 
food and forms of 
coercion influenced 
cooperation (+) 




for negotiations (+)  
 
6. Negotiations 
between state and 
insurgent work 
when facilitate by 
key individual 
Yes, very important, the 
Boer and British military 
leadership enabled the 
negotiation efforts (+)  
Not important, given the 
tacit manner in which 
negotiations took place 
(-) 
Yes somewhat, the 
FMLN was always 
ready to talk, regardless 
of the key leadership 






7. Negotiations can 
succeed when using 
the 
compartmentalizing 
that do not require 
overall linkage 
The employment of the 
concentration camps 
influenced Boers to 
demobilize and enter into 
peace talks  (+) 
Yes, the tacit negotiation 
efforts where conducted 
in a compartmentalized 
fashion, arguably the 
strongest technique 
employed by the state 
(+) 
No, no evidence that 
negotiation efforts took 





Given the results of the hypothesis demonstrated in the proceeding chart, 
hypothesis 5 performed the best.  Hypotheses 3, 4 and 7 performed marginally.  Finally, 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 performed poorly.  Furthermore the author makes the following 
assertions in regards to the outcome of each case study.   
The Boer War, although the British defeated the Boers militarily, one of the terms 
of the Vereeniging Agreement was for the British to leave Transvaal, South Africa.  That 
said, although the Boers were defeated, they won politically, based their eventually 
gaining independence from Britain.  Therefore given the Anglo-Boer War, the author 
would only marginally suggest that the British won.   
The Malayan Emergency, the employment of “The Briggs Plan” facilitated an 
environment of social cooperation and political stability.  That environment, in turn, 
enabled a clearly decisive victory for the British. 
The El Salvadoran Civil War, given the terms to which the FMLN and the state 
agreed upon and the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, the author would assert 
that the outcome to the El-Salvadoran Civil War was a draw.  This is further evident by 
the numbers of FMLN political members currently employed with the government at 
high political positions.   
Nevertheless, given the “Road to War” and the “Testing of the Claims” for each 
case study, this thesis will now employ the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 
II.  Based on the information gathered from “Testing the Claims,” the thesis will measure 
this data against publications specializing in the areas of: conflict resolution, irregular 




completion of Chapter VI the reader will have a concept of the structure and intent of the 



























VI. ANALYZING THE CLAIMS 
Given the information gathered from the aforementioned “Testing the Claims,” 
this chapter will apply characteristics of the following definition of a conceptual 
framework as applied to the issue of negotiations, to support this thesis:  
A set of interrelated concepts, explicit or implicit, underlying the 
procedures of negotiation strategies employed by a state.  There is no 
general agreement as to the contents of this conceptual framework but a 
possible model derived based on conflict resolution, strategic 
development, social control, and irregular warfare publications and 
articles. (“Conceptual framework,” n.d.).  
A. NEGOTIATIONS IMPLY WEAKNESS, ENCOURAGING FURTHER 
VIOLENCE 
This framework will serve as the foundation for a notional negotiation strategy 
which will be developed in the following chapter.  That said, the first hypothesis tested in 
this thesis is that negotiations imply weakness, and encourage further violence.  This 
author asserts, given the three case studies, that the common thread of success in each 
case was the state’s ability to negotiate from a position of power.  This power prevented 
the insurgents, in each case, from massing effective reprisals.  Therefore, this author 
suggests that entering into such negotiations did not imply weakness.  On the contrary, by 
employing a negotiation strategy, the state exemplified moral and ethical strength.  
Nevertheless, such a suggestion is contrary to that of Cassandra Cavanaugh, a Central 
Asia specialist for Human Rights Watch.  With reference to the Central Asian 
insurgency, she asserts the following: 
Thus, any peace-talk initiative by governments at this stage could serve to 
fuel the insurgency, rather than extinguish it… Some might see it as a sign 
of military weakness” (as cited in Burke, 2005)  
However, Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton of the Harvard 
Negotiation Project suggest that Cavanaugh’s claims are not accurate.  Fisher, Ury and 
Patton believe that “Negotiation does not mean giving in” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, 




state and the insurgent; however, by no means is negotiating a way of giving in.  As 
Major General (Retired) Jeffrey Lambert, former Commander of the John F. Kennedy 
Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, alluded to in his CSIS presentation, 
“given an irregular warfare environment, the non lethal approach must be considered 
prior to the lethal approach” (Lambert, 2005). General Lambert’s theory coupled with 
Metz’ (n.d.) observation below speaks to the employment of a negotiation strategy.   
…the ability to innovate and adapt was one of the primary reasons the 
British were more successful at counterinsurgency in Malaya than the 
American army in Vietnam. (Metz, n.d., p294)  
Although the cases examined employed successful negotiation strategies, Che 
Guevara’s, On Guerrilla Warfare (1962) suggests that strength not only lies on the field 
of battle but in the morality exemplified by combatants.  The following passage furthers 
this point, “In your conduct towards the civilian population, show great respect and 
demonstrate moral superiority” (Guevara, 1962, p. 19-20).  The British Army, during the 
Boer War, though, did not subscribe to Guevara’s moralistic ideology relative to the 
civilian populace.  In fact, the British Army did the opposite.  Sensing that victory was 
theirs; the British Army instituted concentration camps and destroyed the Boers’ farms 
and livestock.  The implementation of these tactics ensured that the negotiation efforts of 
the state would not be compromised by effective violent guerrilla activities.  By 
employing the concentration camps, the British did not “take the moral high ground” 
expected from a state.  Furthermore, the British Army’s approach during the Boer War, 
was not the exception.  During the Malayan Emergency, the British Army employed 
“The Briggs Plan,” another unique, compartmentalized technique to foster social control.  
In this case, the control employed by the British during the Malayan Emergency 
facilitated, “a self inducing negotiative state.”  That is to say, an environment that is 
incentive based, fostering good faith negotiation efforts and occasional direct action 
operations, arguably, influenced the soft core insurgent and local populace to conduct 
“tacit” negotiation within themselves to facilitate stability and cooperation.  This 





process.”  The efforts of the civilian or soft core insurgent to comply with the terms of the 
theme of the negotiation effort without the input from a focal leader are furthered within 
such a “leader-less” environment.   
Although the British Government during the Malayan Emergency employed 
similar techniques to those initiated during the Boer War, this author feels, given the “self 
inducing negotiative state,” there were no grave moral or ethical compromises associated 
with “The Briggs Plan.”  Although the weakest state in all three cases examined, during 
the civil war, El Salvador employed negotiation efforts from a position of strength as 
well.  Yet, the approach was an “iron fist in a velvet glove.”  In this case, the state 
conducted negotiation efforts with the insurgents, assuming the moral and ethical high 
ground in efforts to diplomatically counter the insurgency. Simultaneously, the “heavy 
handed” employment of the El Salvadoran military in concert with the non-state 
sponsored irregular (death squad) operations worked to counter the insurgency militarily.  
Although there was a reliance on military force to defeat the El Salvadorian Insurgency, 
the moral and ethical posture of the negotiation process was viewed as a stronger tool of 
the state than the military.  Granted, there have been cases in which the state may view 
the employment of a negotiation strategy as a sign of weakness, and, therefore, some 
states are reluctant to commit to such a strategy.  Ironically, the reluctance to negotiate 
can cause further violence.  An example of this is seen Italy’s “Red Brigades” and the 
murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro.  In this case, the Red Brigades wanted to 
negotiate with the state for the release of an injured fellow terrorist; however, the state’s 
reluctance to negotiate and refusal to hear the terrorists’ request resulted in the murder of 
the Prime Minister Aldo Moro.   
Then there is the morality of a particular strategy. Consider Usama Bin Laden’s 
“Fatwa” and what Mark Juergensmeyer, author of, Terror in the Mind of God (2001), 
terms the “Cosmic War,” the War between the moral vs. immoral, good vs. evil, God vs. 
Satan. The following excerpt from Bin Laden’s “Fatwa” alludes to the “Cosmic War”:  
the west has committed crimes not only against the people but also against 
God; therefore, war was declared against the west (evil) in the name of 




To defeat this “Cosmic War” mentality, the state must employ a morally and 
ethically sound negotiation strategy that discounts the adversary’s moral and ethical 
justification for war.  Thus, in light of the analysis of the proceeding claim, the author 
asserts that  
• The state should negotiate from a position of power (militarily, 
economically, tribally, socially, politically etc…) 
• By negotiating from a position of power, the insurgent, in most cases, will 
not view the state as being weak 
• The state should consider, within an irregular warfare environment, the 
non-lethal before the lethal approach. 
• The state’s position of power will, in most cases, influence the insurgent to 
not conduct further violent activities against the state during negotiations  
• It is important to have military power to facilitate the state’s position and 
perception. However, the state, must also demonstrate the moral and 
ethical strength for which democratic states are historically known. 
• Some insurgents see the conflict as pitting good vs. evil; therefore, the 
state must assume the moral high ground to disorient the “ Cosmic War” 
argument 
• By failing to negotiate the state may encourage more dangerous insurgent 
activity 
• Don’t wait until your position is weak to start negotiating  
 
In addition to the above claims, Joseph McMillan’s Talking to the Enemy: 
Negotiations in Wartime suggests the following: 
It is obviously difficult for the layman to perceive a moral rule for 
negotiations in a war against unmitigated evil, while in war of lesser 
consequence; there will be strong pressure for a negotiated settlement on 
the grounds that almost any peace is preferred to war. (McMillian, 1992, 
p.459) 
McMillian’s passage suggests that to employ a negotiation strategy during a 
“Small War” is elitist.  The “common man” would not understand such a stance during 
such an insignificant conflict.  However no matter the scale of war, an aristocratic posture 
is what’s needed to pursue peace...  As Fisher, Patton and Ury of the Harvard Negotiation 
Project observe, “…you are negotiating with them (insurgents) even if you are not talking 
with them” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.161).   In the cases previously examined, a 




and a clear interpretation of the issues.  In that regard, the following section will examine 
the state’s approach when negotiating with insurgent leadership. 
 
B. INSURGENTS CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WITH BECAUSE OF THEIR 
LACK OF CENTRAL LEADERSHIP. 
A common perception, given the decentralized, networked nature of an 
insurgency, is that a central leadership is nonexistent. In light of this non-existent central 
leadership, many policy makers and senior military leaders believe insurgents cannot be 
negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership.  This claim is actually 
disproved in two of the three cases examined, considering the direct manner in which 
negotiation efforts took place between the state and leader of the insurgency.  However in 
the third case a tacit approach to negotiation with the insurgency took place between the 
state and abstractly the civilian population which in fact was the “central leadership.”  
Even the Cuban insurgency, according to Che Guevara (1962), possessed some form of 
leadership structure:   
In Cuba, our basic unit was the squad, headed by a lieutenant with eight to 
twelve men.  Usually, four platoons made up a platoon and four platoons 
mad up a column.  Our column had 100 to 150 men, headed by a major. 
(Guevara, 1962, p. 38) 
All three case studies of this thesis suggest a command structure that resembled 
either a “western conventional” or a “communist influenced command structure.”  During 
the Boer War, the Boers represented the Boer Army of South Africa; therefore, the 
command structure was hieratical as a traditional army command structure.  The only 
reason why the Boers resorted to guerrilla tactics and decentralized warfare was because 
these tactics represented their only concept of winning.  Early in the war, the Boer’s 
fought conventionally and were defeated.  This is why the Boer’s switched to guerilla 
warfare. Although the Boer’s employment guerrilla tactics, their hierarchical command 
structure of facilitated direct negotiation efforts between the state and the leadership of 
the insurgency. These negotiation efforts were enforced up and down “the conventional” 




Similarly, R.W. Komer’s, (1972) The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: 
Organization of A Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, suggests that the Malayan 
insurgents were organized in a communist block structure.  Actually, the Malayan 
Insurgents’ leadership structure more closely resembled that to which Guevara (1962) 
alluded previously.  However, it should be noted that although organized in such a 
fashion, this organization of the insurgency did not facilitate negotiation efforts between 
the state and the leadership of the insurgency.  As mentioned previously in “Testing the 
Claims,” the center of gravity for the Malayan insurgency was the civilian populace and 
defected insurgents. The inability to communicate with the leadership of the insurgency 
facilitated a tacit negotiation atmosphere.  This tacit approach to negotiations established, 
among other things, an incentive based environment.  The incentive based society that 
“The Briggs Plan” facilitated was an environment unfriendly to the “hard core” insurgent.  
The “squatter” and former insurgent were offered incentives to comply with the demands 
of the state.  These incentives influenced a “self inducing negotiative state” for both the 
“squatter” and former insurgent to “negotiate within themselves” for self perseveration. 
By cooperating with the state and facilitating a stable political and social environment, in 
essence, the squatter and the defected insurgent formed networks that further enabled the 
Briggs Plan to counter the insurgency.  That said, Arquilla suggests, “it takes a network 
to fight a network.” (Arquilla, 2003)  In the case of the Malayan Emergency, compliance 
to the Briggs Plan placed the squatter and/ or the soft core insurgent in one such 
“network.”  
Finally, the FMLN was organized along the same communist organizational 
structure; however, contrary to the Malayan insurgents, the FMLN’s, commander and 
spokesperson, Shafik Handal was at the forefront of negotiations in support of the 
FMLN. Handal’s direct negotiation efforts were not just restricted to El Salvador.  
Handal directly fostered negotiations on behalf of the FMLN throughout Central 
America, North America and Europe.  Nevertheless, Handal was not alone; considering 
the extreme pressure from the international community, Presidents Duarte and Cristiani 




With the election of Duarte in 1984, a new era of peace talks began.  
President Duarte invited the FMLN-LDR to the negotiation table in 1984 
in La Palma. (Blandon, 1995, p.72) 
Therefore, in response to the claim that insurgents cannot be negotiated with 
because of their lack of central leadership, the author asserts the following:  
• In the case where the insurgency has central leadership, employ the 
negotiation strategy directly through the central leadership to the masses 
• In the case where there is no central leadership, negotiate in a tacit manner 
through what the state believes is the insurgent’s center of gravity or key 
terrain.    
• In the case where the state is  facing a decentralized adversary, at the point 
where a central leader prevails from the insurgency, negotiate directly 
through this leader to the group 
• In the case where there is no leader, key terrain or center of gravity to 
negotiate with, the actions of the state can imply good faith negotiation 
efforts by the state   
• It takes a network to communicate to a network (even if it is through non-
verbal communications).  It takes a network to fight and defeat a network 
 
If and when policy makers and military leaders enter into negotiations with an 
insurgent leader or the “center of gravity,” negotiations must be perceived by the 
insurgency and the people as negotiations in “good faith.”  Consequently, the problem 
that faced El Salvador early in the negotiation process under President Duarte was that 
the negotiations appeared flawed.  For “over a period of four years, Duarte tried to bring 
about peace through peace talks with the FMLN-LDR, but negotiation were full of 
uncertainties” (Blandon, 1995, p.72). Therefore, this thesis will next examine the state’s 
approach in implementing a good faith negotiation process to deter violent reprisals. 
 
C. THE PERSISTENCE OF A GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 
CAN OUT LAST VIOLENT REPRISAL EFFORTS BY NON-
COMPLIANT ACTORS. 
While examining the claims of each case study, it was determined that in order to 
have credible negotiation efforts, both the state and the insurgent must employ a 
steadfast, uncompromised strategy.  This negotiation strategy must embrace the 




actors.  To amplify this point, Che Guevera suggests that “To attain the stature of a true 
crusader, the guerrilla must display impeccable moral conduct and strict self control” 
(Guevara, 1962, p.31).  Furthering this idea, the author suggests that in the face of 
violence and ridicule, the state and the insurgent must adhere to a theme of the good faith 
negotiation efforts.  The three case studies examined in this thesis reveal that all three 
negotiation efforts were conducted in “good faith.”   
In Thinking Strategically, Dixit and Nalebuff suggest that “…public policy, 
combined with awareness of how tipping works, can help stop momentum toward tipping 
and preserve the delicate balance” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p 245).  The passage speaks 
directly to the employment of The Briggs Plan during the Malayan Emergency.  Given 
the public policy and extensive information campaign, General Briggs fostered an 
incentive based environment.  The incentive based environment “tipped” the local 
populace and soft core insurgent’s perception when complying with The Briggs Plan. 
Within the good faith negotiations of The Briggs Plan, the populace, the squatter, and 
former insurgents received employment, land, amnesty, money, etc. in return for the their 
compliance, which, along with the attributes associated with the plan, were not only 
publicized by the “media” but through a “word of mouth epidemic.” (Gladwell, 2000)  
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, if the negotiation efforts appear inadequate, in most 
cases, they will not work, as evidenced by the early negotiations stages of the El 
Salvadorian Civil War. In fact, the most violent reprisal to negations efforts from among 
the three case studies examined occurred during the El Salvadorian Civil War.  
In Getting to Yes, Fisher, Patton and Ury suggest how noncompliant actors will 
act in the face of negotiation efforts. “They can attack your status by making you wait for 
them or by interrupting the negotiations . . .”(Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.136).  In efforts 
to derail or interrupt the negotiation efforts by the state and the insurgency, a military 
unit called the “Atlacatl Battalion” murdered six Jesuit priests and their servants.  The 
murder caused international outrage and concern.  Nonetheless, in spite of this event, the 
negotiation process stayed the course.  Arguably, due to international intervention after 




a peaceful resolution.  Yet, Mark Juergensmeyer (2001) suggests that “performance 
violence” is what captivates the onlooker, turning a somewhat barbaric incident into a 
symbolic religious statement.  This religious symbolic statement, to some, illustrates the 
“cosmic battle,” the power of good and a potential recruitment tool (Juergensmeyer, 
2001).  Considering this concept in light of the “Atlacatl Battalion” incident, one could 
infer that the intent was to “recruit” further support from the international community and 
state in efforts to defeat the insurgency.  As such, considering the examples of a 
negotiation process outlasting violent reprisal of non-compliant actors, the author 
suggests the following: 
 
• The state should not conduct the negotiation efforts in the secrecy! The 
state should utilize information technology assets; word of mouth, etc. to 
publicize the negotiation efforts.  By publicizing the good faith negotiation 
efforts of the state, the covert manner in which the insurgent operates is 
threatened; due to “soft core” insurgent and local populace potential 
compliance. 
• The state should utilize information technology assets to gain support from 
the international community, given the state’s moral stance promoting a 
good faith negotiation strategy in the face of adversity 
• The state’s word must be its bond.  The state must expect non-compliance 
from both the state and insurgent sides.  Therefore, as good faith 
negotiation efforts are perceived as being defeated by violent reprisals, 
this is the time to really employ the true sprit of the good faith negotiation 
strategy and defeat the non-compliant actor morally. 
• To mitigate the effect of “performance violence,” the state must employ 
negotiations in “good faith.”   
• To “tip” an environment, the state must utilize public policy and 
awareness to influence an environment.  
•  The entity that employs a good faith negotiation effort assumes the moral 
high ground  
 
Although persistent “good faith negotiation” efforts can outlast violent reprisals 
by non-compliant actors, in most cases; a negotiation process between two rational actors 
takes place in a “step by step” iterative fashion.  This being the case, the following 
section will now analyze to what extent cooperation between the state and insurgent 





D. NEGOTIATING BUILDS COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND 
INSURGENT, “STEP BY STEP”, THROUGH AN ITERATIVE PROCESS. 
Robert Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation suggests, “Only the small units were 
involved in the Prisoner’s Dilemmas.  The high commands of the two sides did not share 
the view of the common solider . . .” (Axelrod, 1980, p.76).  The previous observation 
may have merit, given a conventional wartime environment.  However, based on the 
asymmetrical environment faced by the insurgents in each case study, this author 
generically suggests that the high command is usually of the insurgency (the people), and 
that the leader as well as the fighters face the same dilemmas.  That said, the three cases 
examined support the claim that negotiating builds cooperation between state and 
insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process.  An analysis of the Boer War 
reveals that cooperation between the state and the insurgent was accomplished in an 
iterative manner, mainly due to organization and command and control of the Boer 
Army.  Although both sides, for the most part, were not in favor of negotiation process, 
the combatants at the lower and higher echelons reluctantly complied, based on the faith 
of the “leadership.”  Although the Anglo-Boer War case speaks to an iterative process to 
facilitate cooperation; this case also teeters on the cusp between getting even versus 
getting what you want.  The establishment of the concentration camp can be viewed as a 
tactic of getting even for the massive causalities inflicted by the Boer guerrilla.  However, 
such a tactic can clearly impede negotiations. 
Consider the Pentagon’s reaction to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81.  
Shortly after the crisis began, a news reporter asked a Pentagon 
spokesperson what the armed forces were doing to help.  The 
spokesperson answered that there was not much they could do without 
jeopardizing the lives of the American hostage.  The Pentagon, he 
continued, was working on tough measures to be carried out after the 
hostages were released.  Why would the Iranian students release the 
hostages if they believed that the United States would retaliate soon 
afterward?  The Pentagon made the all-too-common mistake of confusing 
getting even with getting what you want. (Ury, 1991, p36) 
Certainly one could interpret the establishment of the concentration camps as 
intended to ensure there would be no attempt by the Boer guerrilla to interfere with 




camps was in direct response to the massive deaths of the British soldiers.  That said, the 
measures employed by the state in the Boer War to maintain peace talks, though 
questionable, did enable an iterative negotiation process.   
During the Malayan Emergency, the iterative, “step-by-step” process was pursued 
in a slightly different manner.  The introduction of both the reward-for-surrender and 
amnesty programs facilitated “a self negotiating iterative process.”  As such, this case 
speaks directly to the “Insurgent’s Dilemma.”  The insurgent was faced with either 
complying with state’s incentive based environment through defection, or starving and 
being killed by the state.  The subsequent compliance with the Briggs Plan suggests that 
the “squatter,” former insurgents and state agencies all operated within a “mutually 
restraining” environment.   Similarly, Robert Axelrod in Evolution of Cooperation 
depicts the levels of “mutual cooperation” displayed by two opposing sides during World 
War I:   
The Allies, in particular, pursued a strategy of attrition whereby equal 
losses in men from both sides meant a net gain for the Allies because 
sooner or later Germany’s strength would be exhausted first.  So at the 
national level, World War I approximated a zero-sum game in which 
losses for one side represented gain for the other side.  But at the local 
level, along the front line, mutual restraint was much preferred to mutual 
punishment. (Axelrod, 1980, 76-77) 
Although in a conventional combat environment the give and take of the “zero-
sum” game is how commanders assess winning and defeat, this frame of thought is, in 
most cases, contrary to the asymmetrical, decentralized world of guerrilla warfare 
personified by the Malayan insurgent.  In the case of the Malayan Emergency there was 
no feasible way to determine victory and defeat given the “zero-sum” game.  Therefore, 
as mentioned above, at the lower levels “mutual restraint” was demonstrated among 
combatants.  That said, given the Malayan population that complied with the Briggs Plan, 
within a “mutually restrained” environment, the iterative process of cooperation among 
the populace was self administering. Dr Gordon McCormick, Chairman of the Defense 
Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and an expert in irregular warfare 




thinks; it’s important what the guerilla does.”  Given the characteristics of “mutual 
restraint,” Marc Sageman (2004), author of Understanding Terror Networks, underscores 
the theme of “mutual restraint”: “Hamas leaders deliberately held off attacking during the 
spring and early summer in order to give the PLO negotiations with Israel an opportunity 
to finalize a withdrawal.”  (Sagemen, 2004)  
The information gathered from the El Salvadorian Civil War also suggests that the 
cooperation developed by both state and insurgent was enabled through an iterative 
process which, according to Blandon, extended at the state executive levels, from one 
president to another. 
In El Salvador, two negotiation periods took place: President Duarte’s 
Negotiations (1981-1988) and President Cristiani’s Negotiations (1989-
1992).  These periods had some critical differences in terms of political 
circumstances and the negotiating strategies of the parties to the 
Salvadorian Conflict.  (Blandon, 1995, p.20) 
Although President Duarte initiated peace talks, his efforts were in vain due to a 
perceived flawed platform; however, as time evolved, and a new president took office, 
the iterative process to build cooperation was furthered due to President Cristani’s efforts 
and the international communities’ commitment to peace.  In this case the iterative 
process of cooperation took approximately twelve years before resulting in the surrender 
of the FMLN. Unlike the “zero-sum” game noted earlier, the FMLN’s surrender and 
defeat solidified the organization’s political recognition within El Salvador and the 
international community.  The FMLN’s “failure” is further amplified by Dixit and 
Nalebuff, who stress that “success is determined by relative rather that absolute 
performance.” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p.226)  Given that negotiating builds cooperation 
between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process, the author 
asserts that  
• The state cannot confuse getting even with getting what they want. 
• Given the irregular warfare environment of the insurgent, in most cases, 
success is relative opposed to absolute.  Therefore, the give and take of the 
“zero-sum” game does not effectively measure success   
• Given the irregular warfare environment of the insurgent, the step by step 




• Due to “mindsets” the iterative process is not always between state and 
insurgent.  History has demonstrated that the iterative process could reside 
at the executive levels of state.  Sometimes, personnel at the executive 
level of the state or at the “high commands” of the insurgency must be 
convinced in a step by step, iterative manner in order for compliance.  
 
Recognizing the iterative, step-by-step manner in which negotiations take place 
between the state and the insurgent, the foundation of that “interaction” may be perceived 
as a blend between coercion and cooperation.   Che’ Guevara (1962) abstractly speaks to 
this point from the guerrilla’s perspective in On Guerrilla Warfare:  
The guerrilla must hammer away constantly.  The enemy solider caught in 
this operation is not allowed to sleep, his post are attacked and 
systemically liquidated.  Throughout the day…the enemy is made to feel 
that he is inside hostile jaws. . . . the guerrilla must have absolute 
cooperation from the people living in the area . . .  (Guevara, 1962, p.11) 
Acknowledging this mix of coercion and cooperation, the following sections will 
illustrate this tactic necessary to initiate and maintain good faith negotiations for peace. 
 
E. NEGOTIATIONS WORK WHEN THERE IS AN EQUAL BLEND OF 
COERCION AND COOPERATION 
The preceding passage by Che’ Guevara (1962) alludes to the use of coercion in 
relation to cooperation.  The asymmetrical nature of guerrilla warfare is directly 
influenced by the blend of coercion and cooperation, and, this blend is the mechanism 
that could influence the negotiation efforts between the state and the insurgency. While 
examining the claims in support of the three case studies, the author strongly supports the 
claim that negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and 
cooperation.  While on the surface this claim appears to be a contradiction, the Boer War 
provides an excellent and, perhaps, the best example of the three cases examined, that a 
blend of coercion and cooperation in support of a good faith negotiation strategy is 
necessary within an irregular warfare environment.  Fisher, Patton and Ury, abstractly 
speak to the British Army’s approach to asymmetrical warfare in both the Anglo-Boer 




send them a message different from what they expect.” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.26-
27)  In that regard, the “non-combative” approach by the British in both cases certainly 
descended the insurgent deeper into the asymmetrical, irregular warfare environment.  
Given the irregular warfare environment of the Malayan Emergency, Britian’s initial 
approach, was one of direct action.  The British maintained this approach for seven years 
until the employment of “The Briggs Plan, ” which represented a new counter insurgency 
strategy. As William Ury (1991),in Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from 
Confrontation to Cooperation, asserts, “The essence of the breakthrough strategy is 
indirect action.  It requires you to do the opposite of what you naturally feel like doing in 
difficult situations.” (Ury, 1991, p10)  Given the success of the insurgents during the 
Boer War and Malayan Emergency, the state ultimately was forced to employ tactics 
opposite, sometimes contrary, to their military strategic culture to leverage influential 
levels of coercion against the insurgency essential to promoting a state of cooperation.  
Similarly, during the El Salvadorian Civil War, the evolution of cooperation through 
coercion was focused on the insurgent as well as the state.  Although good faith 
negotiations occurred throughout the El Salvadorian Civil War, the FMLN would 
conduct violent demonstrations to ensure the peace talks would continue.   
Ironically, many historians of the El Salvadorian civil war suggest the partial 
motive that fueled the FMLN’s violent demonstrations was the desire for the United 
States Military Advisors to continue to advise the El Salvadorian Army.  Experts such as 
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, a former military advisor during El Salvador and current Professor at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA, suggests the FMLN believed the United 
State’s presence, in El Salvador during the Civil War would ensure more humane 
treatment to the local populace and the insurgency. In a way, the presence of the United 
States advisors changed the interaction between the insurgent and the state.  Axelrod 
furthers that suggestion by noting, “The cooperative exchange of ’mutual restraint‘ 
actually changed the nature of the interactions.” (Axelrod, 1984, p.85)  Nevertheless, 
during the  El Salvador Civil War, the cooperation that the state and the insurgent desired 




basic human needs . . . Basic human needs include: security, economic well-being, A 
sense of belonging, recognition, control over one’s life” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.48).   
The above mentioned interests closely parallel those the FMLN was fighting for.  
Yet, in the FMLN’s cooperation and surrender, the organization received those very 
interests for which they had fought for twelve years.  Therefore, based on the nature of 
conflict surrounding the irregular warfare environment, the author of this thesis advocates 
a blend of coercion and cooperation as the most important aspect in determining the role 
negotiations play in defeating an insurgency.  The power that the state negotiates from, 
although supported by a moral and ethical foundation, is “unconsciously” influenced by 
the state’s ability to employ coercive measures.  The state’s ability to “keep everybody 
honest” is equally important.  This attribute was demonstrated in each of the case studies 
examined for this thesis.  Given the information gathered and analyzed, the following 
assertions are made in support of negotiations when there is an equal blend of coercion 
and cooperation.  
• The state must lessen predictability.  Being predictable is the recipe for 
“protracted warfare”; therefore, employ tactics and methods that diverge 
from a state’s regular doctrine. 
• The state must speak to the human needs in order to prevent further 
insurgent activities. 
• The employment of good faith negotiation efforts that speak to human 
needs can serve as a coercive device in support of cooperation. 
• The employment of coercive tactics, even if the battle is won, can further 
the state’s position of power. 
• The presence of a “more powerful” third party can foster and maintain 
negotiation efforts.  
Although this thesis favors the claim negotiations work when there is an equal 
blend of coercion and cooperation, the author understands that in efforts to combat 
coercive tactics, an adversary can assume a cooperative posture and gain the moral high 
ground.  As Ury (1991) urges,   
If the other side’s best alternate to a negotiated agreement is to use 
coercion, you can prepare in advance to counter it.  Think about how to 





Thus the balance between the coercion and cooperation is essential not only for 
peace but for reputation and perception regionally and throughout the international 
community.  In light of the aforementioned assertion, is it essential for key individuals to 
facilitate good faith negotiation efforts through the proper blend of cooperation and 
coercion?   According to Malcolm Gladwell, author of The Tipping Point, How Little 
Things Can Make a Big Difference,  
Word of mouth [is] epidemic . . . A piece of extraordinary news travels a 
long distance in a very short time mobilizing an entire region . . . word of 
mouth –even in this age of mass communications  and multimillion dollar 
advertising campaigns—[is] still the most important form of human 
communication.  (Gladwell, 2000, p.32) 
This “word of mouth epidemic” carries further and “infects” by “The Law of the 
Few,” consisting of: connectors of mavens and salesmen.  Therefore, this thesis will now 
examine the claim that negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by 
key individuals.   
 
F. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND INSURGENT WORK WHEN 
FACILITATED BY KEY INDIVIDUALS 
Upon analysis of the asymmetrical environments of the three cases examined, this 
thesis supports the claim negotiations between state and insurgent work when 
facilitated by key individuals.  As Malcolm Gladwell states, even Paul Revere was  
. . . a connector . . . he was a fisherman, a hunter, a card player and a 
theater-lover, a frequenter of pubs and a successful businessman.  . . . 
[Had] Revere been given a list of 250 surnames drawn at random from the 
Boston census of 1775, there is no question he would have scored over 
100. . .  (Gladwell, 2000, p. 56-57) 
Gladwell (2000) suggests that Paul Revere, was a connector.  As Revere was able 
to influence and move people, masses, in a manner unattainable by persons of less 
stature.  In The Tipping Point, Gladwell advocates three main ideas which support factors 
of the “word of mouth epidemic”:  The Law of the Few (connectors, salesmen and 




of Content (the proper time to employ the message).  Consequently, the next portion of 
this thesis will emphasize Gladwell’s main ideas in respect to the preceding thesis claim. 
The author will also introduce Joel S. Migdal’s, Strong Societies and Weak States: States-
Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, to supplement the role 
individuals can play when exercising social control measure over the masses.   
All three case studies previously examined demonstrate the importance of a 
connector, maven, or salesman in defeating an insurgency.  In the case of the Boer War, 
both Louis Botha, the Commandant-General-of the Boer Armies and Field Marshal Lord 
Herbert Kitchener Commander-in-Chief of the African Army for Peace served as what 
Gladwell (2000) would term, “connectors.”  Gladwell characterizes connectors as 
“people with a special gift for bringing the world together” (Gladwell, 2000, p.38).  He 
furthers this characterization by adding, “We rely on them to give us access to 
opportunities and worlds to which we don’t belong” (Gladwell, 2000, p.54).  Therefore, 
the two commanders of the Boer War brought the world of the disenfranchised insurgent 
and the professionalized army together.  Although the two commanders were 
“connectors,” in order for the two commanders to “sell” a mutual restraining environment 
among non-compliant actors, the two commanders were also salesmen. In essence they 
were individuals possessing “skills to persuade us when we are unconvinced of what we 
are hearing , and they [salesmen] are as critical to the tipping of ‘word of mouth 
epidemic’ as the other two groups” (Gladwell, 2000, p.70).  Gladwell would likely 
identify the insurgent leader as a maven, given both the leader’s connection to the people, 
and the ideology, and given the leader’s knowledge of how to employ the “word of 
mouth epidemic.” Gladwell characterizes a maven as  
a person who has information on a lot of different products or prices, or 
places.  This person likes to initiate discussions with consumers and 
respond to their request (62)  
Mavens have knowledge and the social skills to start word-of-mouth 
epidemics.  What sets Mavens apart, though, is not so much what they 




Given the layers of bureaucracy of the state, the ability of the commander to 
employ “maven-like” tactics, in most cases, is generally limited.  During the El 
Salvadorian Civil War, Shafik Handal, the leader and spokesperson of the FMLN, was a 
connector, maven and salesman, while on the state’s side, Presidents Duarte and Cristiani 
also served as connectors. During the Malayan Emergency, the employment of The 
Briggs Plan illustrates Gladwell’s (2000) theory of the connectors, salesmen and mavens.  
The relocated “squatter,” given his access to the people and the insurgent could serve as a 
connector.  The reformed insurgent, given the results of the good faith negotiation efforts 
of the “The Briggs Plan,” the access to the people, and his ability to employ the “word of 
mouth epidemic” to convince more insurgents to defect, demonstrated the characteristics 
of a connector, salesmen and maven.   
Still another British Army example that supports Gladwell’s (2000 theory on 
“The Law of the Few” was the British Army’s utilization of the Kikuyu tribesmen 
“pseudo gang” operations.  As Arquilla illustrates in Caroline Elkin’s, article “The 
Wrong Lessons” in The Atlantic Monthly, 
When conventional military operations and bombing failed to defeat the 
Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya in the 1950’s, the British formed teams of 
friendly Kikuyu tribesmen who went about pretending to be terrorists.  
These “pseudo gangs,” as they were called, swiftly threw the Mau Mau on 
the defensive, either by befriending and then ambushing bands of fighters 
or guiding bombers to the terrorists’ camps.  (as cited in Elkins, 2005).  
The Kikuyu’s ability to “infiltrate” the insurgent infested environment of the Mau 
Mau clearly demonstrates Gladwell’s (2000) concept of “The Power of the Few.”   
In that regard, Gladwell’s (2000) theory on social control through the employment 
of the connector, the salesmen and the maven appears to be sound, even in an 
asymmetrical environment.  Nevertheless, this author feels that in order for Gladwell’s 
theory to be even more effective within an asymmetrical environment, Joel Migdal’s 
“Strongman” concept should supplement Gladwell’s theory.  Migdal (1988) in Strong 




They (Strongmen) have succeeded in having themselves or their family 
members placed in critical state post to ensure allocation of resources 
according to their own rules, rather than the rules propounded in the 
official rhetoric, policy statements, and legislation generated in the capital 
city of those put forth by a strong implementator.  (Migdal, 1988, p.256) 
Migdal’s (1988) “Triangle of Accommodation” with critical strongman 
intervention serves to foster stability enabling country modernization. However within 
the scope and context of this thesis, the same intervention can also can serve to stabilize 
an irregular warfare environment.  The local strongman in “triangle of accommodation” 
is the linchpin and the “honest broker” ensuring the proper balance between policy 
implementer (the state) and the local populace.  Although state policies are “in effect,” 
the local strongman, knowing the true needs of the people of the country, facilitates and 
fosters an environment within which the people of the country are comfortable.  In most 
cases, the policy intended to foster modernization or stabilization, is too ambitious for the 
local populace to support.  Therefore, the local strongman intercedes and emplaces 
centrally determined policies designed to solve and adjudicate local scandals.  The 
strongman is positioned within the “policy chain” so that he can act on legislation from 
the implementers prior to it reaching the people.  Yet, the strongman, based on his 
influence, is “virtually” positioned adjacent to the local politicians.  Therefore, the 
normal sequence of “policy implementation” is such that a policy coming from the 
implementer arrives at the strongmen and politicians nearly simultaneously.  Then, in 
knowing the people, the strongman will approach the politicians with policy 
modifications that will better fit the needs of the local populations.  However, in some 
cases the strongman will disregard the politicians and emplace the “strongman’s policy” 
to support the people.  Although the strongman serves as the “clearing house” for local 
policies that facilitate modernization, it is not uncommon for implementers themselves to 
publicly consult with the strongman “to get the pulse of the people” prior to instituting a 
policy.  Activities such as publicly consulting the strongman lead to a more solid 
perception of the implementer by both the local populace and the strongman.  Of course, 
such a perception is dependent on the implementer’s desire to listen and “implement” 




As John Arquilla suggests, the first step in winning the war against a networked 
foe is to “learn as much from the intifada (violent campaign) as our adversary has.” 
(Arquilla, 2003)  In essence, the employment of Gladwell’s (2000) theory of “The Power 
of the Few,” and Midgal’s “Strongman’s concept,” could mitigate the implied Arquilla 
“learning curve.”  Maybe the Briggs Plan vaguely speaks to this possibility, though it 
does not appear that Midgal’s theory was entertained during the Malayan Emergency.  
Therefore, considering both the influence of Migdal’s (1988) strongman and Gladwell’s 
(2000) “Power of the Few,” the author makes the following assertions: 
• In most cases, in order for good faith negotiation efforts to influence the 
local populace and insurgent, Migdal’s “Strongman” concept must be 
employed 
• The individual identified as the strongman must possess the characteristics 
of a connector, salesmen and maven 
• By employing the strongman concept, the state is employing “the people’s 
choice” 
• The employment of the “Power of the Few theory” has a high potential for 
selected individuals to infiltrate a prescribed area without detection.   
• The employment of the “Power of the Few” has the potential to be a 
powerful tool to undermine a network adversary 
• The employment of Information technology should be used to publicize 
the strongman’s intervention and rebuttal of certain state policies in 
support of the people  
• The state’s utilization of the “The Power of the Few theory” in concert 
with the “Strongman concept” may lessen the learning curve associated 
with determining the motivation of the insurgent. 
• Although the strongman is the people’s choice, the state must select him 
and employ the balance of coercion and cooperation on him.  
Simultaneously, the strongman must employ the proper balance of 
coercion and cooperation to stabilize the environment. 
Although the individual identified as the village strongman has demonstrated the 
characteristics of a connector, salesman and maven, these characteristics are worthless 
unless, his message “adheres” to the targeted populace.  Thus, the second method of 
spreading “the word of mouth epidemic” is through a sticky message.    
When most of us want to make sure what we say is remembered, we speak 
with emphasis.  We talk loudly, and we repeat what we have to say over 




Gladwell (2000) suggests emphasizing a message through volume and repetition, 
in order for a message to have the “stickiness” needed to influence a population. 
Considering the three cases within this thesis, all contain tactics intended to reinforce the 
stickiness of a prescribed message.  In the case of the Boer War, Johannes Paulus 
Kruger’s statement, “It is our country that you want” served as sticky message which 
united the Boer Army against the British.  However, given the asymmetrical manner in 
which guerrilla warfare is fought, action speaks louder than words.  The establishing of 
the concentration camps and destruction of the Boer’s farms constituted the “sticky 
message” to the Boer Guerrilla.  Nevertheless, in an irregular warfare environment, direct 
action, in most cases is not the fix to the situation.  Therefore the state “experimented” 
with tactics and techniques unfamiliar to the state’s wartime strategic culture.  Gladwell 
furthers this claim using commercial advertisements to illustrate this point:  
To figure out which ads work the best, direct marketers do extensive 
testing. They might create a dozen different versions of the same ad and 
run them simultaneously in a dozen different cities and compare the 
responds rates to each. (Gladwell, 2000, p.93) 
In a sense, this was the approach taken by the state in all three cases.  The state 
determined that direct action was not going to defeat the insurgent. Therefore, other 
tactics were employed in hopes for the “stickiness” of a tactics to take hold and 
effectively influence the insurgent and civil populace.  The approach to warfare given the 
Malayan Emergency speaks directly to this tactical shift.  For seven years the British 
employed direct action techniques in both the urban and rural environments of Malaya.  
These tactics persisted until the establishment of “The Briggs Plan.”  As “The Briggs 
Plan” became “stickier,” planners and orchestraters of the plan became emboldened to 
modify the stickiness of the message for further effect. Although The Briggs Plan 
embodied the stickiness needed to convince and influence masses of people, the crux of 
the plan was the employment of what Gladwell (2000) would term, the “golden box.”  In 
this instance, the “golden box” was the incentive based society associated with The 





The key to (Lester) Wunderman’s success was something he called the 
“treasure hunt.”  In every TV Guide and Parade ad, he has his art director 
put a little gold box in the corner of the order coupon. (Gladwell, 2000, p. 
94) 
The gold box, Wunderman writes, “made the reader/ viewer part of an 
interactive advertising system.  It was like playing a game . . .” (Gladwell, 
2000, p.95) 
Subscribing to the “golden box” during the Malayan Emergency, the civilian 
populace, squatters and reformed insurgents were interactive players within “the system” 
that was designed to counter the insurgency.  That system was the Briggs Plan and its 
efforts to defeat the Malayan Insurgent.  Conversely, during the El Salvadorian Civil 
War, the “golden box” concept was not as effective as it was during the Malayan 
Emergency.  The violence demonstrated during the El Salvadorian Civil War 
overshadowed the “golden box” of peace.  As Gladwell (2000) suggests, though, “If the 
message is not sticky, do not junk the efforts, just employ another golden box.” 
(Gladwell, 2000, p.132)  Congressman Joe Moakley’s investigation and report that 
uncovered the findings in support of the Jesuit Priest Killing is an example of the golden 
box theory.  However, this employment of a new “golden box” set the stage for 
negotiations.  Based on the Moakley Investigation, the “golden box” of support for the El 
Salvadorian government and military was threatened, and threatening to take away the 
military and humanitarian aid (the golden boxes) from El Salvador spoke louder than 
words.  These threats forced the El Salvadorian Government, the El Salvadorian Military 
and the FMLN to a negotiation table governed by United Nations representatives.  The 
threat to the “golden box” facilitated “mutual restraint” by all parties.  The El Salvadorian 
Civil War, therefore, demonstrates that the stickiness of the message can be re-enforced 
by threatening the removal of the “golden box.”  In an insurgency, the ideology of the 
insurgency itself plays the same role as the “stickiness of a message.”  In all three case 
studies, what gave the insurgencies life and motivation was the ideology.  The ideology 
served as the incipient for warfare.  Dr. Michael Freeman of the Naval Postgraduate 





• To identify the problem and tell you what is going on in the world 
• To identify the threat 
• To offer an end state  
• To justify the means  
• To put the struggle in a broader contents (Freeman, 2005) 
Recognizing how an ideology serves as the “Stickiness Factor” for an insurgency 
allows the state to employ means to destroy not the insurgent, but the ideology.  By 
employing Gladwell’s (2000) “word of mouth epidemic” and Migdal’s (1988) 
”Strongman concept” there is potential for the networked adversary to be undermined and 
countered.  Based on that potential, the author asserts the following in support of 
Gladwell’s “Stickiness Factor” in relation to the role negotiations could play to counter 
an insurgency:  
• As demonstrated in the claim, “Insurgents cannot be negotiated with 
because they lack central leadership”; given an irregular warfare 
environment, tacit negotiation efforts prove to be as effective as formal 
negotiation efforts. 
• Given the personal nature of a good faith negotiation strategy, the state 
must employ many different approaches, keeping in mind tribal, religious, 
economical, and governmental differences.  There is no one doctrinal 
approach to satisfying entities with different needs. 
• The state’s employment of  a “golden box” enables the person to interact.  
The golden box must offer opportunities of ownership and pride in one’s 
town, religion, government, economical standing etc. 
• If the original golden box does not work, establish a second to which the 
people will respond.  Once the people react, offer interaction and 
ownership 
• The state should have a general concept that supports the insurgent’s 
ideology. The state, by having this general concept, can more effectively 
employ “Strongmen” to counter the ideology and hard core insurgent as 
well. 
So far, this portion of the thesis has spoken to persons who exhibit the 
characteristics of a connector, salesmen and maven; it has also re-enforced that theory 
through the use of Joel S. Migdal’s, (1988) ”Strongman Concept.”  One may ask, 
therefore,, when is the proper time to employ such a person armed with a sticky message 





. . . in order to be capable of sparking epidemics, ideas have to be 
memorable and move us to act . . . . Epidemics are sensitive to conditions 
and circumstances of the times and places they occur. (Gladwell, 2000, p. 
139) 
The passage above suggests what Malcolm Gladwell (2000) would term, “The 
Power of Content.”  The following paragraphs, therefore, will examine “The Power of 
Content” against the three case studies.   
Within each case study, successful negotiation efforts depended upon the time 
period during which the efforts occurred.  The phasing and timing of the employment of a 
negotiation strategy was critical, given the external factors which had a potential 
influence on the negotiation efforts.  During the Anglo-Boer War, the proper time was 
interpreted to be when the Boer guerrillas appeared to be losing and the concentration 
camps were established.  Under those conditions, the Boer were more compliant and 
likely to concede to the demands of the state.  Furthermore, the conditions faced by the 
Boer spoke directly to Gladwell’s (2000) assertion that “. . . sparking epidemics, ideas 
have to be memorable and move us to act. . . . . Epidemics are sensitive to conditions and 
circumstances of the times and places they occur” (Gladwell, 2000, p 139).  The spread 
of the negotiation strategy in both the Boer War and the El Salvadorian Civil War alludes 
to James Q. Wilson’s and George Kelling’s, “Broken Window” theory featured in 
Gladwell’s Tipping Point.  The Broken Window theory argues that  
…crime is the evitable result of disorder.  If a window is broken and left 
unrepaired, people walking by will conclude that no one cares and no one 
is in charge.  Soon, more windows will be broken, and the sense of 
anarchy will spread from the building to the street on which it faces, 
sending a signal that anything goes. (Gladwell, 2000, p. 141)  
Abstractly applying the “Broken Window theory” to the Anglo-Boer War and the 
El Salvadorian Civil War, the author of this thesis concludes that the violence and human 
right violations were symptoms of the “Broken Window” theory.  Early on in both of 
these conflicts, the international community viewed the respective struggle as “not our 
problem.”  However, as civil rights infringements came to light, people started taking 




windows” in the case of the Boer-Anglo War, was public out cry from the international 
community and the British civilian populace.  During the El-Salvadorian Civil War, the 
response was threats from international partners, namely the United States, to “pull” 
financial, logistic and military support from the State.  A method employed to counter the 
“Broken Window” theory, though elementary, was allowing the insurgents to be heard.  
Allowing the insurgents a voice gave the “impression” that someone was actually 
listening to their complaints and desires.  To further this thought, Fisher, Patton and Ury 
assert that “It has been said that the cheapest concession you can make to the other side is 
to let them know they have been heard” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.34).  
In line with James Q. Wilson’s and George Kelling’s “Broken Window” theory, 
the Malayan Emergency’s Briggs Plan employed this theory in an abstract manner.  
Wilson and Kelling suggest, “small, close-knit groups have the power to magnify the 
epidemic potential of a message of idea” Gladwell, 2000, p.174).  The relocation of the 
squatter and the reformed insurgent facilitated the forming of close knit groups.  The 
subsequent “success stories” of the two groups influenced others to comply to the 
demands of The Briggs Plan.  The momentum caused by The Briggs Plan broke enough 
“windows” that the hard core insurgents’ ability to counter the incentive rich environment 
was in vain.  The previous assertions of this claim, as well as the prior claims suggest a 
non-violent approach in countering an insurgency.   
Given conventional warfare and the zero-sum game associated with it, direct 
action and kinetic air strikes are favored against a more symmetrical foe.  Within 
conventional warfare and integration of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force assets, John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt suggest an integration which he terms a “Swarm.”  The 
characteristics of a “Swarm” are as follows: 
A carefully structured, coordinated way to strike from all directions at a 
particular point or points, by means of a sustainable “pulsing” force and 
or/ fire close-in as well as from stand-off positions.  It will work best—
perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the deployment 
of myriad small, dispersed, networked maneuver units.  The aim is to 




Furthermore, Arquilla and Ronfeldt offer the following in support the U.S. 
Military’s potential adoption of the “Battle Swarm” doctrine. 
In Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, slightly more than 300 Special Forces 
soldiers, who were networked with each other and with various air-based 
attack assets, quickly toppled the Taliban. . . . Right now, many military 
leaders are attracted to the concept of ’network-centric’ operations. 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2003) 
Acknowledging both the characteristics associated with the “Swarm,” this author, 
nonetheless, supports the employment of non-lethal swarm like tactics (ie: Strategic 
Swarm) similar to those abstractly employed in The Briggs Plan to defeat the Malayan 
Insurgency.  The employment of incentive plans, amnesty programs, re-location 
operations, food rationing, and targeted information campaigns during the Malayan 
Emergency served to undermine and counter the insurgency.  Direct action operations 
during the Malayan Emergency, some may argue, were a “sideshow”: the real impact 
came from the non-lethal application of The Briggs Plan.  Therefore, the author of this 
thesis asserts that 
• By listening to the insurgent, the state can acquire critical information to 
determine when the time is right to employ the mechanisms to counter the 
insurgency. 
• The “epidemic” of violence can “snow ball” if not deterred and contained. 
• Utilizing information technology assets to publicize success stories of 
networked groups complying with the negotiation strategy can facilitate a 
“broken window” epidemic. 
• Information technology coupled with the “word of mouth epidemic” can 
enable the momentum needed to influence soft core and local populace to 
comply with the demands of an incentive based society driven by a 
“Strongman.”  
• The religious, political, tribal, and economical Strongmen should be 
structured in a networked like fashion. The state must arm the network 
with a “sticky message,” re-enforcing the exploitation of the information 
operation assets, information campaigns and an incentive based society in 
a swarm-like fashion.   
• The employment of swarm-like negotiation process, in a reoccurring 
manner, must “speak louder” than the insurgents and other external noise 





Regarding the asymmetrical approach to warfare, the United States Institute for 
Peace observed, “Military force is sometimes necessary, but cannot serve as the exclusive 
focus of our response” (Stares and Yacoubian, 2005)  Similarly, Steven Metz’s (n.d.) 
article “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” found in  
Anthony D. McIvor’s (2005) , Rethinking the Principles of War, amplifies this point by 
noting, “throughout history successful counterinsurgents . . . tended to be those who 
understood the enemy’s strategy and rendered it ineffective through means other than 
simply killing insurgents” (Metz, n.d., p.293).  Therefore, this thesis will next examine 
the compartmented, non kinetic approach undertaken in efforts to defeat an insurgency. 
 
G. NEGOTIATIONS CAN SUCCEED WHEN USING 
COMPARTMENTALIZING STRATEGIES THAT DO NOT REQUIRE 
OVERALL LINKAGES 
Recognizing the nature of asymmetric warfare, this author does not totally 
discount, kinetic and direct action operations.  Direct action and kinetic operations are a 
much needed aspect of warfare within either a symmetrical or asymmetrical environment.  
However, within the dimensions of warfare, there must be a balance of applications.  
Considering the three cases examined within this thesis, all three relied on direct actions 
to some extent.  However, once the states understood the enemy’s strategy, all three 
“render[ed] it ineffective through means other than simply killing insurgents” (Metz, n.d. 
p 293).  In two out the three cases examined, the state employed other tactics that aided in 
the defeat of the insurgency.  The tactics employed were compartmentalizing strategies 
that did not require overall linkages.  In that regard, the compartmented strategy that 
this thesis will apply in analyzing the case studies is the Institute for Peace’s “Counter 
Epidemic Strategy.”  The Counter Epidemic Strategy examines how the medical 
professions contain and defeat medical epidemics.  The following are the stages 
associated this technique: 
• Beyond its metaphoric appeal, there are a number of approaches to 
countering this (epidemiological) complex phenomenon. Three stand out: 
• First, epidemiologists observe rigorous standards of inquiry and analysis 




• Second, epidemiologists recognize that diseases neither arise nor spread in 
a vacuum. 
• Third, public health officials have come to recognize that success in 
controlling an epidemic typically results from a systematic, prioritized, 
multi-pronged effort to address each of its constitutes elements. (Stares 
and Yacoubian, 2005) 
As previously mentioned, the stages above suggest sequentially how to treat a 
biological epidemic, and yet the United States Institute for Peace alludes to these stages 
in how to prevent and defeat the spread of a network adversary. The first stage in 
“treating” the spread of a networked foe, as suggested by Paul B. Stares and Mona 
Yacoubian of the USIP, is to contain the epidemic.  By containing the epidemic, the state 
employs a method of compartmentalization.  This approach applies directly to the British 
and their efforts during both the Anglo-Boer War and The Malayan Emergency.  During 
the El Salvadorian Civil War, because of the international intervention and willingness of 
the insurgent to comply with a negotiated solution, the compartmented approach was not 
employed.  The British during the Anglo-Boer War and Malayan Emergency employed 
containment operations; these operations consisted of concentration camps during the 
Boer War.  During the Malayan Emergency, relocation of the “squatter” took away and 
contained critical logistic support and intelligence needed by the insurgent. The second 
stage, that of “treating” an insurgent infected areas is, as suggested by Stares and 
Yacoubian of the USIP, intended to protect those who are most susceptible to the disease.  
Protecting those in an insurgent infected area involves not allowing propaganda that can 
influence the local populace to sympathize with the insurgent’s efforts.  The third 
“treatment” suggested involves the remedy. This author suggests that the remedy for an 
asymmetric, insurgent condition is to employ what Malcolm Gladwell (2000) would term  
“an infectious agent theory,” (word of mouth epidemic) consisting of the Law of the Few, 
the Stickiness Factor, and the Power of Content.  Similar to USIP’s concept, Fisher, 
Patton and Iry suggest the following:   
At the Harvard Negotiation Project we (the authors) have been developing 






designed to produce wise outcomes efficiently and amicably.  This 
method, called principle negotiations or negotiations on the merits, can be 
boiled down to four basic points: 
• People: Separate the people from the problem. 
o The author of this thesis asserts, through direct or tacit 
negotiation efforts within an incentive based society, the state can 
“segregate” the environment from the hard core insurgent (the 
problem). 
 
• Interest: Focus on interest, not positions. 
o The author of this thesis asserts the interests of the state and 
the majority of the people within an insurgent infected 
environment are first, political and social stability, and second, 
cooperation between the people and the state. 
 
• Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to 
do. 
o The author of this thesis asserts, communication within the 
irregular warfare environment is critical.  Listening to the 
adversary has the potential to pay huge dividends.  Furthermore, 
the state at times needs to listen to its representatives and ensure its 
actions are consistent with their rhetoric.  This approach could 
enable options and further influence both sides when deciding 
what to do next.  
 
• Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard. 
o The author of this thesis asserts, the objective standard set 
forth in a negotiation strategy is to comply with the terms.  
Therefore, to influence the compliance to certain terms, the author 
of this thesis suggests that the terms be aligned with human rights 
and needs to facilitate a stable and cooperative environment. 
   (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.10-11) 
 
By straying away from conventional means of warfare, the states, in most cases, 
stray away from their comfort zones, and an analysis of all the case studies suggests a 
serious mindset change occurred prior to the employment of tactics inconsistent with a 






…history matters in determining today’s technology choices.. . . recognize 
early potential for future lock-in—once one option has enough of a head 
start, superior technological alternatives may never get a chance to 
develop. (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p.238) 
In some case alternate and more effective methods of conducting warfare are 
sometimes discounted due to historical success based upon the fire, maneuver and 
symmetry of the battlefield.  Therefore, the author of this thesis asserts the following:  
• Innovation is needed when fighting a non-conventional opponent  
• Taking away critical needs from the insurgent, could force him onto an 
”island” 
• The state could employ host nation security forces to contain a specific 
area.  By containing an area, controls the access in and out of this 
specified area. 
• Through the employment of the Strongman concept, that state can 
“remedy’ the area by determining golden box who are “good guys” and 
“bad guys.” 
• The state’s incremental application of the USIP’s Counter Epidemic 
Strategy mitigates the insurgents’ ability to grow in a particular area. 
Based on the preceding claims and analysis conducted by the author this thesis 
will next develop a notional negotiation strategy intended to counter an insurgency.  
While developing the notional negotiation strategy, the author will apply this conceptual 
framework.  Although the information gathered will serve as the foundation of the 
negotiation strategy, the author will employ additional supplementary works to 




VII. NOTIONAL NEGOTIATION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 
(IRAQ) 
War must be an extension of diplomacy by other means, but, in turn, 
diplomacy must be an extension of war by other means.  U.S. security 
strategy must be based on understanding that diplomacy, peace 
negotiations, and arms control are also an extension of—and substitute 
for—war by other means.  (Cordesman, 2004, p.41) 
As demonstrated in chapters III-V, it appears that negotiations have played a part 
in countering insurgencies.  In chapters III-V, the author evaluated the historical case 
studies against the thesis’ hypotheses.  The findings of the evaluated hypotheses suggest 
that negotiations in conjunction with precise kinetic operations were a viable means by 
which to counter an insurgency.  In evaluating the hypotheses against information 
gathered from the case studies, however, some elements of the hypotheses, though 
proved beneficial overall, failed to live up to the level of performance predicted.  These 
findings were demonstrated in the chart at the end of Chapter V.  Nevertheless, the author 
examined these findings against the conceptual framework in efforts to gain a more 
definitive perspective on the information gathered.  The intent of the gathered 
information is to aide in the development of a notional negotiation strategy with regard to 
the current case of Iraq.  
The introductory passage in this chapter, by Anthony H. Cordesman suggests that 
not only is diplomacy an extension of war by other means, but means such as peace 
negotiations and arms control can be elements of a substitute for war as well.  It appears 
that the United States’ approach to irregular warfare in places such as Iraq feeds what is 
termed, “a security dilemma” (Jervis, 1978).  Robert Dorff characterizes Robert Jervis’, 
“Security Dilemma” which appeared in the 1978 article entitled Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma (Jervis, 1978) as the following: 
actions undertaken by a state to increase its security (such as expanding 
military capabilities) [which] will lead to counteractions taken by other 
states, leading eventually to the paradoxical outcome that all states will in 




 The more US military assets engaged in efforts to secure the unstable environment of 
Iraq, the more mechanisms of the state there are for Iraqi insurgents against which to 
employ violence.  The aforementioned employment of violence serves to empower the 
insurgent, both “militarily” and in the battle of the story.  Not only during this security 
dilemma do insurgent attack mechanisms of the state, but the insurgent conducts attacks 
on innocent civilians to further re-enforce his ability to shape and influence the physical 
and political environments.  In support of the uses of negotiation to counter an 
insurgency, the author of this thesis will design a notional negotiation strategy focusing 
on facilitating stable and cooperative environments, both politically and socially.  By 
facilitating a stable and cooperative environment, both the government of Iraq and the 
Iraqi people will get what they need, versus any party “getting even.”  Therefore, the 
assertion made by the author is that what is needed to enable cooperation and stability is 
the employment of a mechanism, the notional negotiation strategy, to mitigate the 
“security dilemma” in Iraq.  That said, the following text will demonstrate the 
characteristics of a notional negotiation strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq. 
 
Characteristics of the military notional negotiation strategy  
Historically, many industrialized countries have approached the asymmetric 
warfare environment in a “zero-sum/ tit-for-tat” manner.  Although many states employ 
the “zero-sum” approach, and have been successful at this approach, this thesis does not 
advocate the “zero-sum approach” to countering an insurgency.  The zero-sum/ tit-for-tat 
method of fighting a war suggests that you know who your enemy is and his potential 
capabilities to do damage to you.  Arguably, the preceding conditions are not the case in 
asymmetric warfare.  His gain is not necessarily your loss, and vice versa. Assuming that 
most of the insurgent elements operating in Iraq, as well as around the world, operate 
under the banner of “Cosmic Warfare,” the state must assume a utilitarian as opposed to 
a consequentialist moral posture when employing any notional negotiation.  The 
consequentialist approach suggests efforts conducted by a group or an individual are 




said, the Iraqi Government, with assistance from the Coalition, must employ a notional 
negotiation strategy in a utilitarian manner for the greater good of all.  To amplify this 
point, the negotiation strategy, employing the utilitarian approach, has the potential to 
benefit the Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites, as opposed to significantly benefiting just one of 
them.  The following assumptions are made, based on the case studies in chapters III-V, 
in support of the development of a notional negotiation strategy. 
 
Notional Negotiation Strategy Assumptions: 
• Both the state and the insurgents are rational actors 
• The insurgents will comply with the initial employment of a negotiation 
strategy. 
• The negotiation strategy speaks to the morality and ethics of the 
community as a whole. 
• Some insurgents see this fight as a “cosmic battle” of good against evil.  In 
the case of Iraq, westerners are viewed as occupiers and imperialists; 
therefore, the insurgent’s efforts are just. 
• As the local populace and soft-core insurgents comply with the terms of 
the negotiation strategy, dissension and in fighting will attack the hard 
core insurgent “veil of secrecy.” 
• Compliance with a negotiation strategy will lessen the possibility of 
protracted warfare. 
• Insurgents, given their commitment to social change, as characterized in 
Chapter I, will be open to negotiation efforts of the state 
• Both the Iraq government and the insurgents recognize the benefits of 
using non-kinetic measures and would prefer to use non coercive or 
physical means (ie: information technology asset, word or mouth, etc…) 
to influence a target audience. 
• The insurgent, being of the populace, has more access to the population. 
• The uses of a third party may be needed to settle the conflict between state 
and insurgent. 
• The third party must be of the insurgent’s population in order for 
arbitration to be effective. 
Given the aforementioned assumptions coupled with the findings from previous 
case studies found in this thesis, the following text will analyze the state’s and insurgent’s 
dominant strategies.  One of the critical attributes of the notional negotiation strategy is 




Therefore, the author has designed a theoretical model illustrating the balance of coercion 
and cooperation and how it is portrayed through information operation assets. Given the 
war of ideas concept in which most insurgencies are based, the author will focus the 
development of the notional negotiation strategy within this domain.  The model will 
illustrate under which conditions each side has dominance and more effective strategic 
moves.  Furthermore, the author will assign cardinal ranking, 1-4, to each strategy 
employed with each condition.  The higher the ranking, 4 being the highest, the more the 
entity (ie: the state or the insurgent) favors the strategy within a specific environment.   In 
the following text, the author will depict the various conditions of the asymmetrical 
warfare environment by illustrating both the coercive approach of the state and 
cooperative environment of the insurgent.  
 
A. THE ENVIRONMENTS OF THE NOTIONAL NEGOTIATION 
STRATEGY (ASYMMETRICAL) 
The following conditions depict the environments that the state and insurgent will 
portray given the exploitation of information assets.  The environment portrayed by the 
information operation assets are illustrated in the Appendix.  During the initial 
employment of the notional negotiation strategy, the dominant strategy determined by the 
theoretical model will actually serve as the initial conditions that the state and the 
insurgents will face.  The following theoretical model does not, however, depict the 
relationship between the state and the insurgent in a classical prisoners’ dilemma.  In fact, 
the following theoretical model demonstrates the scoring matters as viewed through the 
lens of the “battle of the story.”  Given the manner in which hypothesis #5 performed, 
“Negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation,” it will 
serve as the posture the state and insurgent will assume given the theoretical model.  The 
state, by employing the proper degree of coercion, on behalf of a peaceful resolution, 
gains more in the information operations domain.  Conversely, defecting from the terms 
of a peaceful resolution, the insurgent could potentially lose the “battle of the story.”  By 
continuously killing assets and not cooperating with the terms of negotiation efforts, 
which fosters a peaceful environment, the insurgents have the potential to discredit their 




cooperation, like the state’s efforts in coercion or non-coercion,   will be demonstrated 
through the use of information operations.  That said the initial conditions are what will 
be portrayed to the international community by information operations means. The 
environments depicted in the following text will illustrate the degree of cooperation 
demonstrated by the insurgent in relation to the degree of coercion demonstrated by the 
state.  The emphasis of the state, during the notional negotiation strategy may appear to 
be abstract in its application to countering an insurgency.  An example of this abstract 
application of the state’s assets and techniques appears in the four environments in this 
thesis.  The first environment that the Appendix depicts is the state, non-coercive 
approach, the insurgency, cooperative environment.    
The first approach favored by the state is a non-coercive approach.  Given this 
approach, soft core insurgents will comply with the notional negotiation strategy. This 
compliance has been demonstrated in the case studies found within this thesis.  
Furthermore, the insurgent’s desire to negotiate with the US was revealed in the 2005 
Time article, entitled “U.S. Holds Secret Talks with Insurgents of Iraq.”  Given the 
compliance to the negotiation strategy, locals and former insurgents enter into a “social 
contract” consistent with the notional negotiation strategy.  This social contract will 
consist of several incentives such as the ability to exercise one’s civil rights and be 
provided the basic needs, including food, shelter and security. However, when entering 
into the social contract with the state, the insurgent is expected to provide information on 
other insurgents located in that area.  By complying with the terms of negotiation strategy 
early in the fight, the local populace can discredit the state’s kinetic approach to irregular 
warfare. Furthermore, given the locals immediate compliance to the terms of the notional 
negotiation strategy, the indigenous population achieves the advantage given the war of 
ideas.  Although the indigenous population has achieved the advantage, in the area of the 
war of ideas, the state is receptive to this atmosphere.  The achievement of the populace 
is aligned with Dr. Gordon McCormick’s assertion of “it does not matter what they [the 
insurgency] think; it matters what they do.” Given the aforementioned approach by the 
state, the notional negotiation strategy is portrayed through an information operations 




employed by the state, the insurgent has the opportunity to be openly heard, given the 
uses of information operations.  The employment of a third party to speak on behalf of 
the people’s needs is utilized within this environment.  This implementation of means 
suggests that the state, locals and former insurgents can get what they want.  
Nevertheless, this environment in which insurgents comply with a negotiation strategy is 
most feared by the “hard core” insurgents. Furthermore, what is equally threatening is the 
entry into some type of  “social contract” within an incentive based environment. In the 
environment of compliance, the negotiation strategy will potentially “chip away” at the 
veil of secrecy in which the insurgent operates.  The “hard core” insurgent will then view 
the insurgents as a potential “pentiti”—a term used to describe former Italian Red 
Brigade operators who broke the omerta (code of silence) and turned informant.  The 
“pentiti-like atmosphere,” though dangerous to the hard core insurgent, has the potential 
to facilitate violent and undermining conditions within the insurgency. The 
aforementioned conditions would be portrayed within the information operations domain 
potentially causing increasingly volatile conditions for the hard core insurgent (4) 
The second approach the state will employ, in support of the negotiation strategy 
continues along the non-coercive theme.  The expectation of this posture is that it will 
influence others to perceive the insurgent’s non-cooperative (violent) activities as 
inconsistent with stabilization and cooperation.  During this approach, just like the first 
approach, there is a continued heavy emphasis placed on the diplomatic, informational 
and economic means used to counter an insurgency.  Given the political and social 
atmosphere of an irregular warfare environment, the state is encountering non-
compliance with the notional negotiation strategy by the insurgent.  The state is also 
encountering violent reprisal against the government, “soft core” insurgents, and the local 
populace that support a negotiation strategy.  Acts such as the aforementioned will be 
portrayed within the information operations domain to demonstrate to the international 
community that the US, Coalition and host nation, in this case Iraq, are utilizing peaceful 
tactics stabilize the environment.  In this situation, the US achieves the advantage in the 
area of the war of ideas.  Acknowledging this, the state must maintain the moral and 




compliance to the negotiation strategy.  This assertion is further supported through the 
previous claim that good faith negotiations can out last violent reprisals.  Such a good 
faith approach by the state has the potential to be looked upon approvingly, given the 
employment of information operations, by the international community, the local 
populace and soft core insurgents.  (3)  At the same time, when confronted with this 
approach by the state, the hard core insurgent will employ violent measures to facilitate a 
chaotic environment.  Nevertheless, non-cooperative tactics, demonstrated by violence, 
could weaken the insurgent’s argument on morality and the “cosmic battle” (the battle 
between good and evil).  Regardless, given the passive posture of the state, the insurgent 
will take this opportunity to show his strength through violence, in the hope that this 
performance of violence will compel others to join the insurgency.  Although the 
insurgent is portrayed negatively through information operations, he will take advantage 
of this medium to further promote his cause. (1) 
The third favored approach by the state is the employment of coercion for force 
protection and to mitigate the risks of the negotiation strategy.  Given the employment of 
coercion to defend itself, the state runs the risk of inflicting collateral damage on 
structures, monuments or even worse, the local populace.  The accumulation of collateral 
damage could potentially force a local populace “over the fence” to support the 
insurgency.  If collateral damage is inflicted during the defense of the state’s forces, the 
state’s actions can place the integrity and morality of the negotiation efforts in a negative 
light. Here, the employment of information operation assets can potentially hurt the US 
and Coalition efforts if mistakes are made and collateral damage is assessed.  (2)  Though 
marginally rated, the hard core insurgent favors the state’s employment of coercion 
defensively or offensively, given his posture of non-cooperation.  The hard core insurgent 
perceives this as an advantage to the insurgency, given the potential of collateral damage 
and the battle of the story (Cosmic War).   Within this “defensive coercive” environment, 
the insurgent can “frame” an incident and place the blame on the state.  Any such act as 
the aforementioned has the potential to further mobilize the masses given the “Cosmic 
Warfare” argument.  Consequently, the more insurgents, potentially the more attacks will 




government’s military suffer from attrition but, political attrition may strike at the local 
level and potentially within the US via the employment of information operation assets. 
(2).  Arguably, the preceding conditions of state coercion and insurgent non-cooperation 
exemplify the current condition in Iraq.  Although, the initial approaches by the state, in 
support of the notional negotiation strategy deemphasize military coercive action to 
counter an insurgency, in the fourth approach the state will employ diplomatic, 
informational and economical means to refine targeting in support of direct coercive 
offensive operations.  The creditable intelligence gathered through the exploitation of 
other than military means will foster the employment of direct action to further the good 
faith efforts of the negotiation strategy.  Upon entering the social contract, the local 
populace and reformed insurgent are aware of the terms associated with the negotiation 
strategy.  One critical term in support of the negotiation strategy is divulging information 
in support of countering the insurgency, yet the state understands that the validity of the 
information will, in some cases, remain an issue within the asymmetrical environment.  
Nevertheless, the state should only employ coercive offensive operations against high 
payoff targets.  However, military leaders must consider the collateral damage factor 
when employing this approach.  If collateral damage is assessed during an offensive 
operation, the public outcry against the state will be deafening.  The negotiation strategy, 
at this point could become a side show, and the state will have to focus its efforts on 
rebuilding trust and faith with the local population, by employing another “golden box” 
or re-enforcing the social contract with additional incentives between the state and the 
populace.  Although this is the least favored approach by the state and there is a sizable 
risk associate with this approach, the employment of information operation assets would 
foster positive outputs given successful direct action operations and good faith efforts. (1) 
Given the reduced emphasis on direct action, the insurgent will still likely be cooperative 
to the terms of the notional negotiation strategy.  Based on the “good faith negotiation 
efforts” and the social contract entered, the insurgent will remain compelled to support 
the notional negotiation strategy.  That said, although there is not an emphasis on direct 
action operations, the state still runs the risk of mis-targeting and inflicting collateral 




Nevertheless, given the US, coalition and “indigenous” intelligence support to 
direct action operations, there is a possibility that the state will be successful in targeting 
the high payoff targets and personnel non-compliant to the notional negotiation strategy.  
If the state meets with success, coupled with the morality and ethics of a good faith 
negotiation strategy, the hard core insurgent may lose the support of the populace and 
become more of a target for the state.  Furthermore, if the state meets with success, this 
means there will be “pentiti” among the ranks, undermining the efforts of the insurgency.  
If these conditions are prevalent, the possibility of insurgents complying with the terms of 
the notional negotiation strategy is much higher. Within this environment, the “hard core” 
insurgent may start running out of physical space to hide and begin attacking targets out 
of necessity in order to stay relevant with the local populace.  This environment is very 
dangerous for the hardcore insurgent. (3)   Through the lens of information operations 
means, the aforementioned description of the Appendix suggests that the state’s non-
coercive approach and the insurgent’s cooperative posture is the dominant strategy within 
an asymmetrical environment. This assertion is further supported by an excerpt from the 
Appendix, depicting the dominant strategy. 
 





















    
 
That said, the author will utilize the dominant strategy to determine the ends, 
means and ways associated with strategic development of the notional negotiation 




notional negotiation strategy, the author will apply the defined terms, from Chapter I, to 
assist in the shaping of the specific area of the notional negotiation strategy.  With the 
dominant strategy determined, coupled with the information gathered in the preceding 
chapters, the author will now devise a notional negotiation strategy in support of counter 
insurgency operations in Iraq.   
 
B. ENDS (WINNING)  
Without a doubt the intent of the commanders throughout the continuum 
committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom is to win.  General Myers, former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted in 2005, “I’m going to say this: I think we are winning . . . I 
think we’re definitely winning, I think we’ve been winning for some time.” (Gertz, 2005, 
p.6).  Nevertheless, given the abstract manner in which the adversary fights, how can the 
US define winning?  In light of the preceding assertion, the author has determined that 
the goals of the negotiation strategy and winning must be consistent with facilitating 
stability in the political and social environments and cooperation between the people and 
the state.  Upon establishing the key factors of the notional negotiation strategy, of 
cooperation and stabilization, the state will have established the foundation to counter the 
insurgency and win the war.  Furthering this concept, and acknowledging the asymmetric 
qualities of insurgent warfare, the critical task of the state suggests the mitigation of the 
security dilemma facing Iraq.  The initial steps associated with the notional negotiation 
strategy necessitate establishing security to enable cooperative and stabilized 
environments.  Furthermore, in order to for the negotiation strategy to work, the means 
and ways must deny sanctuary to the insurgents and their sympathizers.  Another subtask 
in support of the critical task is to deny the adversary’s network information operations 
campaigns.  By establishing the ends associated with the negotiation strategy, the state 
will advance closer to countering the Iraqi insurgency through negotiations. Given the 
intent of the notional negotiation strategy, the “footprint” of the US military could 
conceptually be reduced.  This author suggests that the reduction of the force, given the 
application of the notional negotiation strategy, be done in an incremental fashion, 




throughout Iraq, the US forces needed in Iraq would continue to decrease.   This 
reduction would counter the assertion made by Anthony H. Cordesman that “the U.S. 
presence in Iraq is increasingly perceived among Arabs as a replica of the Israeli 
occupation in Gaza and the West Bank” (Cordesman, 2004, p.69).  By incrementally 
reducing the U.S. military’s footprint in Iraq, in essence, the military would increasingly 
mitigate the security dilemma.  Accepting these expected outputs of the notional 
negotiation strategy within the asymmetrical environment, the author asserts these 
conditions are the segue to facilitate a form of comprehensive democracy in areas such as 
Iraq and other insurgent infected locations.  By giving the people of the state the choice 
to “make a choice,” the foundation of democracy is laid.  In addition, upon complying 
with the terms of the notional negotiation strategy, the state provides, among other things, 
civil rights and the basic human needs such as security, food and shelter for its populace.  
Although the notional negotiation strategy emphasizes the uses of diplomatic, 
informational and economical means to facilitate the ends of the negotiation strategy, 
there is a place for military means to facilitate the notional negotiation’s strategic ends.  
When the military is employed in pursuit of satisfying the ends of the negotiation 
strategy, the application of the military means must be effective and proportionate to the 
asymmetrical threat the state is encountering.  By employing practices mentioned 
throughout this portion of the thesis, the state and coalition efforts will mitigate the 
potential for collateral damage.  The means needed to enable the asymmetric strategic 
ends of the negotiation strategy are identified in the following text. 
 
C. MEANS (INFLUENCE) 
The United States needs to restructure its land and air forces into a force 
mix that is more mobile, better tailored to rapid reaction, and better suited 
to asymmetrical warfare. (Cordesman, 2004, p.40) 
The means associated with the notional negotiation strategy will mainly focus on 
assets other than military means in pursuit of the ends associated with the notional 
negotiation strategy for Iraq.  The means in support of the notional negotiation strategy 




ends.  The means that the author of this thesis deems influential, in the case of Iraq, 
include the use of the religious, economical, tribal and political Strongmen.  In support of 
Joel Migdal’s (1988) “Strongman concept,” Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (1998), editors 
of Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, suggest the following: 
“Third parties can come from within the conflict, even from one side of it—for example, 
religious figures or business or civil leaders—as long as there is sufficient respect for 
them from all sides and for their capacity to act in a neutral manner” (Harris and Reilly, 
1998, pp 105-106).  Abstractly related to the aforementioned passage is a statement made 
by Major General S. L. Arnold, former 10th Mountain Division Commander, after 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia: “Leaders skilled in negotiation and mediation are 
armed with an effective tool to aid in reducing hostilities and tension in MOOTW 
missions and reduce the potential for escalation of violence” (Arnold and Stahl, 1993, 
p.16).  Given the need for a serious mind set change to counter an insurgency, an 
example of a Strongman that could reduce hostilities and tension in Iraq is Muqtada al-
Sadr.  Al-Sadr, Shiite religious cleric and leader of “The Mahdi Army,” exemplifies the 
characteristics of a Strongman.  Al- Sadr leads and commands through physical and 
religious coercion; as an output he is well respected throughout his “area of 
responsibility.”  It is reported the al-Sadr’s “army” consist of 6,000-10,000 “soldiers.” 
Furthermore, although al-Sadr has directed insurgent activities against the state, the US 
and collation forces, within the past year, it was reported that al-Sadr has advocated and 
supported an amnesty program within Sadr City.  The amnesty program was supported by 
a “weapons for reward” environment and other civil affairs type activities.  The following 
passage advances the aforementioned assertion. 
The agreement stipulates that loyalists of Moqtada Sadr, a rebellious 
Shiite cleric, exchange their weapons for cash and, in return, U.S. and 
Iraqi forces release detainees not convicted of any crimes. The program 
would be followed by as much as $500 million in reconstruction projects 
in the slum.  
Despite the incentive, members of Sadr's militia, the Mahdi Army, have 





Although the preceding passage suggests that the weapons turn-in appears to be 
slow, the act of al-Sadr supporting the US efforts of “demobilizing” the Mahdi Army 
undermines his initial anti-west ideology.  Given the compliance to aforementioned 
terms, violence in al-Sadr city has dropped significantly compared to pre-“weapons for 
rewards.” Moreover his ability to exercise influence as a connector, a maven and a 
salesman gives him instant credibility amongst his people and the state.  By employing 
the Strongman (al-Sadr) in an insurgent rich environment, the state is employing the 
person who is of the people and the people’s choice.  Along this theme, “Neo Tribalism 
in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies, 1991-96” (Baram, 1997) suggests the 
perceived statelessness and lawlessness of Iraq would, in a sense, strengthens one’s tribal 
identity.  Given the preceding observation, the employment of the Strongman, who is of 
the tribe, within this environment could further diminish the efforts of the insurgents by 
focusing and reinforcing on the image of the tribe, the mosque, the state etc.  Based on al-
Sadr’s position, he is the leader MG (Ret.) Arnold (1993) speaks of, the individual who 
can influence this community in support of reducing hostilities.  The “word of mouth 
epidemic” qualities inherent within Strongmen, like al-Sadr, speak to those leaders MG 
(Ret.) Arnold suggests are needed in irregular warfare environments.  It is important to 
note that employing the Strongman to negotiate the terms of the negotiation strategy with 
the populace is not tantamount to appeasing the adversary.  Nevertheless, opponents of 
the aforementioned concept suggest that by negotiating with an insurgent one is 
appeasing.  As stated in previous chapters, by negotiating one is not giving in, one is 
simply listening to the adversary.  Furthermore, as demonstrated in the Italian Brigades, 
namely the Aldo Moro Case, failure to enter in a dialogue with the adversary could 
further violent reprisals.  Both the government of Iraq and the insurgents seek a degree of 
cooperation from the other; therefore, the state and the insurgent both employ methods to 
attain such cooperative results.  To facilitate cooperation and stability, the role of the 
Strongman, who is of the people, is to negotiate not only for the state, but for the people 
of the state as well.  That said, the issue of perceived appeasement losses its credibility 




Another means that the state must leverage in support of the notional negotiation 
strategy is the exploitation of information technology assets in a swarm-like fashion.  The 
employment of the theme and successes of the notional negotiation strategy via 
television, internet, radio, cell phone, children’s cartoons, etc. is powerful and enables 
influential assets to leverage a particular response.  As evidence of this power, consider 
how throughout February 2006, an information swarm attacked the Muslim world in the 
form of cartoons.  The cartoons depicted Muhammad and images of the Muslim world in 
an inappropriate manner.  The images of the cartoons coupled with the violent reactions 
generated, for some, the desired response due to the images portrayed in an informational 
swarm-like manner.   As a consequence, the “cartoon informational swarm” had not only 
affected the Muslim World, but portions of the world-at-large in the same manner.  In 
this regard, the establishment of an incentive based environment, which places the local 
populace and soft core insurgent in a “self induced negotiative environment,” is very 
dangerous to the survivability of the hard core insurgent and his cause.  It is the assertion 
of the author, given the findings of the model depicted in the Appendix, that the promises 
delivered by the Strongman cannot stand by themselves and must be reinforced by other 
aspects of this strategy.  The employment of the informational swarm, within an incentive 
based environment, has the potential to validate the promises of the Strongman.  Yet, 
within the same environment, the “golden box” must be present.  That said, the 
Strongman must have the authority to present the “golden box” in a fashion particular to 
his area of responsibility.  The “golden box” employed in a utilitarian manner will enable 
the population to be active participants in the shaping and employment of the notional 
negotiation strategy.  This participation further threatens the sanctuary of the insurgent. 
The Strongman’s employment of the “golden box” has the potential to evoke the 
response consistent with the notional negotiation strategy. Moreover, as suggested in the 
Appendix, the insurgent within this environment, when faced with the “Insurgent’s 
Dilemma,” either will cooperate with the state’s negotiation efforts, or defect and risk 
getting killed or jailed.  The military presence in places such as Iraq will consist of the 
US and Coalition Forces providing security for a prescribed area, while the state’s 




portrayal of deployed forces further mitigates the security dilemma.  This approach 
advances the image of the state’s law enforcement figures and reduces the US and 
Coalition visibility with the local populace.  Although the government of Iraq possesses 
the means suitable to fulfill the intent of the notional negotiation strategy, the ways by 
which such means are employed will determine if the local populace is receptive to the 
concept of stability and cooperation.  
 
D. WAYS (EFFECTIVENESS) 
Given the manner in which effectiveness was defined in Chapter I, the ways 
associated with the notional negotiation strategy must effectively and transparently foster 
a stable and cooperative environment that threatens the covert sanctuary in which the 
insurgent operates.  In the September 2005 edition of Special Warfare: The Professional 
Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Center and School, LTC (P) Eric Wendt (2005) 
asserts that “. . .the most effective way of interrupting the conversion of insurgents [sic] 
support into output is to attack the insurgent infrastructure.”  (Wendt, 2005, p.6) Given 
Wendt’s assertion, this thesis will employ Migdal’s (1988) Strongman concept, on behalf 
of the notional negotiation strategy to, establish stability and cooperation.  A person of 
the infrastructure or “of the people” has the potential to disrupt the harmony of the 
insurgency and send it into confusion and distrust.  Similarly, the author of this thesis 
suggests employing the Strongman (diplomatic means) in concert with an incentive-based 
society (economic means) and informational “swarm” (information means) to foster more 
creditable and actionable intelligence for potential military direct action operations.  The 
blend of coercion and cooperation employed by the Strongman upon the populace is 
essential to establishing his credibility, not only with the locals, but, more importantly, 
with hardcore insurgents.  A form of coercion that the Strongman could employ is 
through the use of either formal or tacit good faith negotiation efforts.  By employing 
such tactics, the Strongman is able to prepare the environment to receive the terms of the 
notional negotiation strategy.  The balance between coercion and cooperation is further 




Although, the Strongman employs a certain degree of coercion in order to foster 
cooperation from the people, the state, in essence, must apply a proper blend of coercion 
upon the Strongman to properly direct the Strongman regarding the main themes of the 
notional negotiation strategy.  Correspondingly, a certain degree of pressure is placed on 
the state from the international community in order for the state to facilitate an 
environment receptive to the notional negotiation strategic approach.  These transparent 
applications of coercion and cooperation, within an incentive-based environment, are 
portrayed through the exploitation of information technology assets.  The information 
technology assets portray the outputs of the notional negotiation strategy: locally, 
nationally and internationally. Nevertheless, one element that fosters compliance to the 
notional negotiation strategy is the compartmentalization of the country.   
By compartmentalizing Iraq, the potential for the notional negotiation strategy to 
be effective is more attainable.  Given the compartmented efforts of the state to employ 
the notional negotiation strategy, the US and coalition forces task entails securing the 
“outer perimeter.” As US and Coalition Forces secure the “outer perimeter,” 
conceptually, this task will reduce the “western” signature and contain the 
compartmented environment by restricting movement in and out of a prescribed area.  
Simultaneously, the host nation, in this case Iraq, will provide internal security by local 
police and military forces.  The negotiation efforts of the Strongman within the local 
populace will be formal and conducted through other connectors, mavens and salesmen.  
In the situation when there is no one to negotiate with, the state could still employ the 
notional negotiation strategy in a tacit manner.  The deeds and actions of the Strongman 
will encourage the local populace to comply with the notional negotiation’s strategic 
terms.  The Strongman, knowing the people, will deliver state’s command message and 
make it “stick” to a specified populace in a manner desired the by the state.  As the 
message adheres, it will compel the local populace and soft core insurgents to “break 
more windows” given the receptive environment; such actions could then be an indicator 
that it is time for the negotiation efforts to expand.  The time to expand the strategy from 
one area to another is determined after elements of the information technology have 




This “epidemic” of success has the potential to effect the current, as well as the adjacent 
insurgent infected environments, and to facilitate more “broken windows.”  To further 
develop the area for Strongman intervention, the information technology assets must 
project the image of the Strongman negotiating in good faith on behalf of the people.  
The state desires the “broken window” epidemic to spread due to the good news stories 
surrounding the local negotiation efforts taking place.  
Although the US military and Coalition’s task in support of this strategy is to 
provide security, utilizing a small military foot print, the “be prepared to” mission will 
still be to conduct direct action (coercive) operations on specific personnel wanted by the 
US.  These operations are triggered by US national assets and information gathered from 
the local populace upon entering the social contract with the state.  That said, supporting 
the theme of good faith, the US and Coalition forces must execute these coercive 
operations with surgical accuracy, mitigating the effects of collateral damage.  All efforts 
must be made to incorporate, host nation (Iraqi) direct action forces to accompany US 
forces on these operations to further highlight the face of the Iraqi and diminish the face 
of the perceived occupiers.  To aid in gathering information within the incentive based 
environment, be it religious, economic, tribal, etc., the local populace will be rewarded 
for their efforts to rid the insurgency from their area.  The ways associated with the 
notional negotiation strategy are feasible, yet in light of the ends, means and ways 
associated with the notional negotiation strategy for Iraq, the benefits of the notional 
negotiation strategy must out weigh the risk involved in employing it.  The following 
section will mention some benefits associated with the aforementioned military strategy. 
 
E. BENEFITS 
The benefits associated with the employment of the notional negotiation strategy 
relate to security issues and reduction in cost; in addition they complement the shared 
concept of many senior military leaders on how to win the current conflict, and reinforce 
the unconventional warfare efforts against the Iraqi insurgency while empowering the 
state.  The first benefit of the negotiation strategy is the potential reduction of a major US 




deemphasizes the military instruments of national power and places particular emphasis 
on the diplomatic, informational and economical instruments of national power.  This 
emphasis is designed to facilitate more reliance on the Iraqi military and local police to 
facilitate stability and cooperation.  The Strongman, complemented by informational 
swarm-like operations within an incentive-based environment, could potentially serve to 
lessen the US footprint as the environment becomes more stable and cooperative, and as 
the US service members’ presence is reduced.  Earlier in this chapter, the author 
suggested that the reduction of the force be done in a transparent and incremental 
manner.  This incremental method is to ensure that the state assets are ready to assume 
the role of ensuring cooperation and stability, while transparently transitioning US forces 
out of the combat zone and reducing the security dilemma. Reduction of the security 
dilemma will effect the environment initially in a small incremental fashion.  As the 
notional negotiation strategy gains more momentum, the size of US forces transitioning 
out Iraq will increase.   
Given these conditions, the author suggests a second benefit: a reduction in 
spending on the US military.  As the notional negotiation strategy aids in dispelling the 
security dilemma, the US military foot print is marginalized to support the conflict in 
Iraq.  The reduction of forces has a direct impact on spending by the US government in 
support of Operation Iraq Freedom. While the need for the US service members lessen, 
the responsibility of the Iraq military and police forces to maintain a stabilize and 
cooperative environment increases.  This environment, in turn, reduces the military 
spending needed in support of combat operations in Iraq. 
Furthermore, the ways associated with the notional negotiation strategy are 
seemingly consistent with the shared concept of many senior military leaders’ on how to 
win the war in Iraq.  The concept that the author alludes to is the employment of the 
notional negotiation strategy as the indirect approach in efforts to counter the insurgent at 
the local level.  This approach works in concert with the notional negotiation strategy’s 
emphasis on “being prepared to” conduct direct action or US decapitation operations in 




negotiation strategy is already being exercised in Iraq; the only thing missing is a 
“formal” negotiation strategy to aid in countering the insurgency.  
Currently, many US senior military leaders and policy makers profess that the 
military forces currently engaged in Iraq are conducting unconventional warfare.  The 
author of this thesis asserts that the military efforts in Iraq are only marginally reflective 
of unconventional warfare based on the following definition found it Joint Publication 1-
02, DoD Dictionary Military and Associated Terms:  
broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long 
duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces, who 
are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying 
degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct 
offensive, low-visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the 
indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and 
evasion and escape. (as cited in Herd, 2005) 
The reason why the author would make such an assertion is that acceptance of the 
phrase “normally of long duration” is missing from the US efforts in Iraq.  Although US 
forces have been committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom for four years, the rotation of 
units and assests tends to deminsh the effect a unit has on a specified area and the people.  
Thus, the employment of the notional negotiation strategy will, among other things, 
foster the unconventional warfare enviornment that resembles the unconventional warfare 
enviornment that existed during the Malayan Emergency, The Boer War, etc.  Arguably, 
the US lacks the political and social acceptablity to commit US service members to Iraq 
for a consistent, protracted time period, as was conducted in the Boer War and Malayan 
Emergency.  That said, the Strongman, being of the people and living among the people 
and presumably, willing to die with the people, is the constant long range assest the US 
needs to facilitate a more effective and credtable unconventional warfare enviornment.   
Thus far, the success of the notional negotiation strategy has spoken of the 
benefits to US elements supporting the conflict in Iraq.  However, the success of the 
notional negotiation strategy in Iraq, given the emphasis of the other instruments of 
national power and application of the notional negotiation strategy, will redefine the 




strategy will, in a sense, re-build the confidence needed in the Iraqi local police 
authorities and military service members.  Once the Iraqi populace as a whole has 
accepted the characteristics of the notational negotiation strategy, Iraq’s commerce, 
economy, and trade will be revitalized into the international trade community.  However, 
with benefits come risks and counterpoints to the prescribed notional negotiation strategy.  
The notional strategy has its identified risks and the following section will examine them.   
 
F. RISKS 
Given the asymmetric qualities of the physical and political environments and the 
human element of warfare within the asymmetrical environment, there are many risk 
associated with the employment of the negotiation strategy:  
• Violent reprisals may out last good faith negotiation efforts  
• Innocents and former insurgents may be killed 
• The message may not “stick” 
• The negotiation strategy may not work 
• Tribes may not comply with the negotiation strategy  
• Insurgents may view the state’s attempts as weakness 
• The iterative process may not facilitate cooperation 
• Too much coercion may be applied by strongmen 
• Key personnel may not negotiate out of fear of violent reprisals 
• A compartmented strategy may not work 
 
The author recognizes that, given the irregular warfare environment, anything 
could happen when employing negotiation efforts to counter an insurgency.  Nonetheless, 
the risks identified above are largely at the tactical and operational levels. Given 
assessments made by the author, as suggested in the analysis of environments in support 
of the negotiation strategy, the state must be committed steadfastly to the principles of the 
notional negotiation strategy.  The cases throughout this thesis and history have proven 
that a commitment to good faith negotiation efforts mitigates the risk associated with a 
negotiation strategy.  In addition, the cases and history have proven that by employing the 
proper amount of coercion in support of a cooperative environment, the state can outlast 




strategy, the footprint of US military forces is lessened as the presence of the Iraqi 
military and police forces is heightened.  The risk to the force is, therefore, mitigated.   
Furthermore, the risk to the mission is mitigated based on the Strongman 
intervention within in an incentive based, informational swarm-like environment.  Once 
the state has committed to the notional negotiation strategy, any deviation could 
potentially compromise the social contract that the state has entered into with the 
populace. To further amplify this point, the Appendix suggests the state has the strategic 
advantage.  This strategic advantage is a byproduct of the morally inspired notional 
negotiation strategy employed by the state.  Nevertheless, given the irregular warfare 
environment of the insurgency in Iraq, the state must not overlook the influence of good 
faith negotiation efforts. According to the Appendix, the state’s non-coercive posture 
appears to have the strategic advantage over the non-cooperative environment of the 
insurgent. The slightest deviation from the good faith efforts, according to the Appendix, 
could compromise the integrity of the notional negotiation strategy and allow the 
insurgent to assume the strategic advantage within the information operations domain.  In 
spite of the information gathered from the Appendix, however, the potential for the 
mission of the negotiation strategy to succeed, based on the preceding chapters, is higher 
than by employing the current “western” oriented approach to an irregular warfare 
environment.   
In light of the tactical and operational risks associated with the negotiation 
strategy, the risk to the US forces and mission is lessened based on the employment of 
the assets that support the notional negotiation strategy.  The manner in which the 
insurgents conduct their operations has influenced policy makers and senior military 
leaders resistant to negotiation efforts to employ weak negotiation efforts which are 
equivalent to President Duarte’s efforts when he attempted to counter the FMLN in the El 
Salvador case.  Although the government of Iraq current possesses the means suitable and 
the ways feasible to execute the notional negotiation strategy, the political acceptance 





will address several issues, to include the political acceptance and the non-appeasement 




The notional negotiation strategy has associated risks and counterpoints.  Anytime 
the state is engaged in a war of ideas, the state runs the danger of not receiving political 
acceptance from either the policy makers and/ or the US populace to employ certain 
measures.  Furthermore, when engaged in a war of ideas, there are no quick solutions, 
and these conditions are not precluded from the notional negotiation strategy.  Many 
opponents of the notional negotiation strategy assert negotiations would never work with 
the insurgency in Iraq because the tactics employed resemble activities that terrorists 
would conduct.  In fact, many policy makers have assumed the posture of “no 
concessions, no negotiations.”  Yet as demonstrated in Chapter I, the US previously has 
conducted efforts in negotiating with Iraqi insurgents.  However, what is not clear is the 
overarching strategy employed by the US to guide and direct the negotiation efforts. 
Although some may approve of negotiation efforts, those same individuals likely will 
want such negotiation to be conducted secretly.  This preference is advanced by Russell 
D. Howard in, Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment: 
However, it would be very beneficial to have a mechanism—most likely 
secret—that could enable and opportunity to dialogue . . . This would be 
especially important in regard to . . . non-state actors who have no formal 
diplomatic voice.  The manner in which this dialogue might take place 
would depend on the situation.  Discussions could be held in secret or 
through surrogates. (Howard and Sawyer, 2002, p.121) 
The above passage supports the utilization of negotiation, through surrogates (ie: 
Strongmen); however, the manner in which such negotiation efforts take place is opposed 
by the author.  In utilizing the information swarm amplified by Malcolm Gladwell’s 
(2000) “word of mouth epidemic,” the state is accepting responsibility for the conduct of 
the negotiation efforts.  Conducting secret negotiation efforts implies that the state does 




facilitate an environment ripe for a vote of no confidence.  Since the US is already 
conducting “secret” negotiation efforts, the author suggests formalizing the efforts by 
employing the notional negotiation strategy.  By employing the notional negotiation 
strategy, the state publicizes the benefits of such a strategy.  However, as the state 
publicizes the benefits, the state also must maintain the rigid posture of non-appeasement 
to networked adversaries.  By employing the strategy publicly while remaining 
unappeasable, the state allows US policy makers and the general public to become 
politically receptive to such a strategy.  Nevertheless, to determine what role negotiation 
could play in countering an insurgency; the author will provide some final 
recommendations on behalf of this thesis. 
 
H. RECOMMENDATION  
Many Indian campaigns demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetrical 
tactics in countering larger and better armed British and American Forces.  
In fact, “Indian skulking tactics—concealment and surprise, moving fire, 
envelopment and, when the enemy’s ranks were broken, hand-to-hand 
combat—remained the cardinal features of Native American Warfare 
(Strakley, 1998, p.167) over a period of 140 years.  The longevity of their 
effectiveness shows how important it is to develop appropriate responses 
to asymmetrical tactics. (Skelton, 2004, p.125) 
Only metal breaks metal, and our situation, thank God, is only getting 
better and better, while your situation is the opposite of that. (“Transcript,” 
2006) 
Given the information gathered and analyzed throughout this thesis, the author 
asserts that negotiations can work to counter an insurgency.  Furthermore, the author 
advocates the employment of a negotiation strategy as an additional tool to counter 
insurgencies in places such as Iraq.  Although the notional negotiation strategy was 
designed to counter the insurgency in Iraq, the intent of this strategy is to counter any 
adversary within the asymmetrical environment.  As suggested by Skelton (2004), the 
employed longevity of the appropriate responses has the ability to defeat an irregular 
adversary.  For too long the US has been drawn into conflict based on Usama Bin 
Laden’s claim of, “Only metal breaks metal.” (“Transcript,” 2006)  Yet Bin Laden’s 




the irregular warfare environment that the US is currently facing in Iraq, the US needs the 
political acceptability to negotiate with its networked adversary. As demonstrated in 
conflicts from the Anglo-Boer War to El Salvador to Somalia, service members, 
regardless of rank, have conducted negotiation efforts to influence insurgents to comply 
with the wishes of the state.  In the example of Somalia, Major General (Ret.) Arnold 
recognized the power of negotiations and at what levels negotiations needed to take 
place.  
Army leaders at all levels conducted negotiations and informal discussion 
with Somalis on many issues besides local governments.  Political 
negotiation skills were tested during direct negotiations with warring clans 
and factions.  (Arnold and Stahl, 1993, p.16) 
Similarly, David E. Shaver ‘s (1993), US Army Negotiation Expertise: Do We 
Have What We Need? and (Lt Col) Ronald J Bath,  (LTC) Richard D. Crosby, III, (LTC) 
David E.  McCraken, (LTC) Jesse M. Perez, (COL) Wes Wolfe, Mary J. Zurey’s, Roads 
to New Strength: Preparing for Military Operations Other Than War suggest the 
following 
…studies indicate that military officers are good negotiators (Shaver, 
1993, p.4-5) 
…this skill [negotiation] is developed by leaders as a result of on-the-job 
training (OJT) rather than formal instruction in rudimentary elements of 
effective negotiation and mediation.  (Bath, Crosby, McCraken, Perez, 
Wolfe, Zurey, 1994, p.11) 
Although Bath, et al allude to negotiations being an on the job training event, they 
also illustrate the formalized negotiation training which occurred at the intermediate level 
during the late 1990’s.    
As of 1997, The Naval War College is the only intermediate or senior 
service college that has a mandatory training block in negotiations (eight 
hours at command and Staff College and four hours at the war college).  
The National War College has a two-hour focus on negotiations as part of 
statecraft in the Foundations of National Security core course.  The Army 





As effectively as negotiations are portrayed by the case studies in this thesis, the 
time dedicated to developing the skill of negotiating appears insufficient.   The fact is, 
even if the political acceptability is there, the ends are appropriate to the asymmetrical 
environment, the means influential and the ways effective, the military officer currently 
lacks the training essential to exploit negotiation efforts to their full potential.  This 
assertion is borne out by the statement by COL A.D.A Duncan’s, in a letter he wrote 
while assigned as a battalion commander on duty with the United Nations Protection 
Force [UNPROFOR] in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzogovenia  
All officers…need training in negotiation skills . . . some knowledge of 
how a group of people interact would be useful to assist in stage 
management of negotiations round a table.  In the field your commanders  
need to be able to cope with the concept of power projection, shown 
presence, escalation and de-escalation of situation[s] and the principles of 
liaison. (Duncan, 1993) 
Given the education that intermediate officers receive at the Command and 
General and Staff College, the team of Bath, et al. made the following suggestion: 
Include a negotiations course in core curricula. 
Include negotiation and mediation training in all command and staff 
college resident curricula.  The Navy model should be used as the 
baseline.  Nonresident courses of all schools must include the essential 
theoretical and procedural elements of these skills.  Develop and 
implement a more advanced negotiations module for inclusion as a 
mandatory segment in all senior war colleges.  (Bath, et al, 1994, p.13) 
Knowing the power of negotiation and its ability to counter an insurgency, senior 
military leaders and policy makers could potentially leverage the “battle of the story” and 
notions of “Cosmic Warfare” against a networked adversary.  Therefore, the author 
advocates the implementation of a negotiation strategy as an additional tool to counter an 
insurgency.  To properly focus and train Department of Defense assets, the author further 
advocates, an extensive training curriculum starting at the officer career course, and 
advanced non-commissioned officers schools.  As history has shown, abstract 
employment of the aforementioned negotiation strategy has the ability to gain critical 




internationally, there was a bipartisan consensus of nations that subscribed to the grand 
strategy of containment of communism and the deterrence of nuclear war.  Today, 
arguably, there is no international consensus in support of a post cold war grand strategy 
to counter a networked adversary.  Therefore, considering the historical and notional 
success of a negotiation strategy as an additional tool to counter the modern day 
networked adversary, the author also suggests implementation of a negotiation strategy to 
reinforce the current US grand strategy.  As Skelton notes, “Winning a conflict means 
more than subduing the enemy . . . . As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
demonstrated the process of reconstructing the political order, economy and social well 
being of an entire country is as critical as defeating organized resistance.”  (Skelton, 
2004, p.132)  The employment of a negotiation strategy must be undertaken in a balanced 
fashion to facilitate stabilization and cooperation within an asymmetric warfare 
environment.  Therefore, given the irregular warfare environment in which the US is 
currently engaged, the implementation of a negotiation strategy to complement the 
already established tenets of the US grand strategy could prove to be the very “tool” 
needed to fix the current insurgent problems not only in Iraq, but in future irregular 
warfare environments.  Finally, though the notional negotiation strategy appears to have 
utility within an irregular warfare environment, the strategy has further perceived utility 
in countries with which the US is not at war.  The employment of a negotiation strategy 
within an environment where the US is not at war could be a mechanism to prevent or 





























    
 
Initial Analysis  
 
• The dominant strategy for the state is A, “Non-Coercive” atmosphere given a 
cooperative or “Non-Cooperative” environment of the insurgent. 
• The dominant strategy for the insurgent is C, “Cooperation” atmosphere given a 
coercive or Non-coercive environment of the state 
• The Nash Equilibrium is 4,4 
• The likely outcome, given the employment of the negotiation strategy and its 
associated assumptions is:  
o The state will employ a Non-Coercive approach with respect to the 
insurgent’s commitment to a Cooperative environment in support of the 
notional negotiation strategy.  
 
First Moves –Commitments 
• Government: 
o If the Government A then the Insurgents CÆ(4,4) 
o If the Government B then the Insurgents CÆ (1,3) 
 Government has first move 
• Insurgents: 
o If the Insurgents C then the Government AÆ (4,4) 
o If the insurgents D then the Government AÆ (3,1) 
 Insurgent has first move 
 Both sides have a first move 
 ** The advantage comes to the first entity to engage their moves 







• The Government wants C  
• If Insurgents D then the Government BÆ (2,2) 
• If Insurgents D then the Government AÆ (3,1) 
o Government has a threat, yet not consistent to getting what they want 
 
Threats—Insurgent  
• The insurgent wants A 
• If the Government B then the insurgent CÆ (1,3) 
• If the Government B then the insurgent DÆ (2,2) 
• The insurgent has a threat, yet not consistent to getting what they want 
 
Promises—Government  
• The Government wants the insurgent’s C  
• If the insurgent’s C then the Government’s  A Æ (4,4) 
• If the insurgent’s C then the Government’s  B Æ (1,3) 
• The Government has no promise, this condition actually hurts the government 
•  
Promises—Insurgent  
• The insurgent wants the government’s A  
• If the Government A then the insurgent’s  CÆ (4,4) 
• If the Government A then the insurgent’s D Æ (3,1) 
• The Insurgent has no promise, this condition actually hurts the insurgent 
 
Summary of strategic moves 
• Both players have threats and promises, yet the threats and promises are not 
consistent to what each party wants. 
• Given the desires of the state and the insurgency to negotiate, the first “agency” to 
employ such a strategy will achieve the advantage  
• The position of 2,2 is arguably the current situation that exist in Iraq.  This 














































Security levels— Government’s Payoffs 
 
• Government’s maximizing – Insurgent’s minimizing 
• Government’s security level is 3 
• Government’s prudential strategy is A 
 



































• Insurgent’s Payoffs 
• Government’s maximizing – Insurgent’s minimizing 
• Insurgent’s security level is 3 
• Insurgent’s prudential strategy is C 
 
The security level (status quo) is 3, 3.  At the status quo position is where both 
parties can advance their positions north and/ or east. 
Given the findings of the aforementioned model, along with the supporting graph 
on page 153, it suggests that all factors are equal given the desire of both parties wanting 
to negotiate. The Nash Point is 4,4, the insurgent’s (3.65, 3) and state’s (3, 3.65) distance 
from the Nash Point is equal.  At the Nash Point is where arbitration will take place by a 
third party.  These being the case, to further compel locals and “insurgents” to cooperate 
with the terms of the notional negotiation strategy, the state must employ addition factors 
to influence the environment.  Those factors are, by not limited to, incentives, security, 
(physical, political, financial, etc…) basic human needs/ rights, etc…  Furthermore, the 
state’s activities in support of reaching a peaceful resolution through non-coercive means 
must be illustrated through the employment of information operation assets.  By 
demonstrating the state goals through the use of information operations, the state can 
achieve the “battle of the story” advantage in the international community.  On the other 
hand, the insurgent, if aware of the conditions demonstrated in the model and supporting 
graph must employ means, like the state, to influence the terms of the notional 
negotiation strategy.  Based on an insurgency is usually a war of ideas, the insurgent must 
utilize means that speak on behalf of their needs and ideas. A means that could be used, 
like the state, is information operation assets. Although cooperating with the terms of the 
notional negotiation strategy is a tacit manner of communicating cooperation;  the means 
to further get their voice heard is through utilizing a person who is respected locally, 
nationally and internationally  to support  the best interest of the people to the state and 
vice versa.  The aforementioned demonstration of cooperation has the potential to 
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